Race, Rights and the Representation of Children by Feld, Barry
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Race, Rights and the Representation of Children 
Barry Feld 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Barry Feld, Race, Rights and the Representation of Children, 69 743 (2020), available at 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/684. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 




RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE 
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 
BARRY C. FELD* AND PERRY L. MORIEARTY** 
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court issued what is arguably the most 
consequential decision in the history of the American juvenile court. In re 
Gault imported to the juvenile court some of the criminal court’s core 
constitutional protections, including, most notably, the right to counsel. Two 
of the Court’s primary objectives in Gault were to enhance procedural fairness 
and alleviate racial injustice in the juvenile court. Yet, a half century later, 
neither of these objectives has been realized. Gault’s procedural deficits are 
well-documented and the subject of numerous publications commemorating the 
decision’s 50th Anniversary. This Article examines the second objective. We 
claim that Gault did not just fail to alleviate racial injustice in the juvenile 
court; it may have exacerbated it. By endorsing a formal and adversarial court 
process for children, but failing to confer the full panoply of constitutional 
rights afforded adults, Gault helped transform the juvenile court from a quasi-
social welfare agency into a second-class criminal court that metes out the 
punishment but lacks the protection of its adult counterpart. Compounding 
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the toll of this institutional reorientation was a corresponding political 
backlash that produced a series of exceptionally harsh juvenile laws and 
policies. Juveniles of color bore the brunt of these developments. 
The juvenile court is once again at a constitutional crossroads. Catalyzed by 
a series of recent Supreme Court decisions recognizing that children are 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of punishment, legislatures 
and courts are engaged in reform. Gault’s racial legacy deserves attention. 
While buttressing Gault’s procedural protections remains important, even the 
best-trained and best-funded defense lawyers cannot prevent the primary causes 
of racial injustice in the juvenile court: the over-criminalization, over-policing, 
over-punishment, and long-standing demonizing of youth of color and the 
pervasiveness of implicit racial biases among those who determine their fates. 
These substantive inequities require substantive policy reforms. This may be 
one of Gault’s most significant lessons. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the juvenile court 
avoided sustained judicial scrutiny. Established in 1899 by Progressive 
reformers as a rehabilitative alternative to the criminal justice system, 
the juvenile court was to “take [each child] in charge, not so much to 
punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to 
develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen.”1 
Procedural protections were eschewed in favor of nearly unfettered 
discretion, which, proponents believed, would best enable courts to 
diagnose and treat each child’s delinquent behavior.2 
By the 1920s, however, evidence was mounting that juvenile court 
decision making was often arbitrary and its outcomes unduly harsh.3 
Maltreatment was especially pronounced for Black4 children, who 
were routinely denied the juvenile court’s promised solicitude and 
 
 1. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909). 
 2. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 
695 (1991). 
 3. See HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (1927). 
 4. Throughout this Article, the authors capitalize the word “Black” when it is 
used to reference census-defined Black or African American people. In doing so, the 
authors follow the lead of organizations such as the Brookings Institute, which 
recently adopted what it calls “a long-overdue policy to properly recognize the 
identity of Black Americans and other people of ethnic and indigenous descent in 
[its] research and writings,” David Lanham & Amy Liu, Not Just a Typographical 
Change: Why Brookings Is Capitalizing Black, BROOKINGS (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/brookingscapitalizesblack [https://perma.cc/ 
3YYV-XE7R], and authors such as Kimberlé Crenshaw and Catharine MacKinnon, 
who have long recognized the significance of capitalizing a term that denotes 
cultural or ethnicity identity. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to 
reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a 
specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”); Catharine 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. 
WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516 (1982) (noting that “Black” should not be regarded 
“as merely a color of skin pigmentation, but as a heritage, an experience, a cultural and 
personal identity”). Because the term “white” is generally used in this Article to 
reference a socially constructed racial category and not a specific cultural or ethnic 
identity, it is not capitalized. 
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services in the North, and in the Jim Crow South, were “leased,” 
whipped, imprisoned with adults, and executed.5 Yet, even as prominent 
advocates and academics began to call for greater oversight and 
accountability,6 the juvenile court continued to languish in a legal 
backwater that insulated it from systematic examination.7 
This changed abruptly with the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in 
In re Gault.8 A component of the Warren Court’s reported efforts to 
enhance procedural fairness, expand civil rights, and combat racial 
injustice,9 Gault engrafted on to juvenile court proceedings a number 
 
 5. See JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., ADORATION 
OF THE QUESTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3–4 (Shadi Rahimi ed., 2008), 
https://www.burnsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Adoration-of-the-
Question.pdf [https://perma.cc/95YQ-L6GR] (discussing imprisoned black children 
being held with adults and “convict leasing”); GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-
SAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY & JUVENILE JUSTICE 111, 113–16 (2012) (discussing Black 
children being disproportionately imprisoned with adults, whipped, and executed); 
Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A Critical Perspective, 2 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 100 (2003) (explaining that segregated prisons often forced 
Black children to be housed in prisons meant for adults). 
 6. See, e.g., LOU, supra note 3, at 68 (acknowledging the dangers of unfettered 
discretion and “arbitrary powers”); Roscoe Pound, Foreword to the First Edition of 
PAULINE V. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY, at xv (2d ed. 
1952) (likening juvenile courts to the “Star Chamber”); Paul W. Tappan, Treatment 
Without Trial, 24 SOC. FORCES 306, 307–08 (1946) (condemning juvenile courts as 
“treatment without trial”); Matthew J. Beemsterboer, Note, The Juvenile Court—
Benevolence in the Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 464, 475 (1960) 
(arguing that the juvenile court “is merely a euphemism for the star chamber”). 
 7. Courts rarely heard appeals from delinquency proceedings and legal scholars 
failed to address juvenile courts’ systemic failures. Barry C. Feld, My Life in Crime: An 
Intellectual History of the Juvenile Court, 17 NEV. L.J. 299, 303 (2017) (“[F]ew law schools 
offered courses on juvenile justice because, prior to Gault there was no “law” of juvenile 
justice. Generic state statutes creating juvenile courts provided vague substantive 
goals—treatment and rehabilitation—and minimal procedural limitations on judges’ 
discretion. Psychology, criminology, and sociology departments focused more on 
delinquency—why do adolescents commit crimes—than on justice administration—how 
states process young offenders. Schools of social work focused primarily on intervention 
and treatment rather than juvenile justice administration.” (footnote omitted)). 
 8. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 9. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and 
the Conservative “Backlash”, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1484, 1494 (2003) (documenting 
the Warren Court’s concern about racial inequality); Burt Neuborne, The 
Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 86 (2010) (noting 
that the right to counsel cases were driven by concerns about racial inequity); David 
Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1805 (2005) (arguing 
that “criminal procedure in the Warren Court era was famously preoccupied with 
issues of illegitimate inequality, particularly those associated with race”). 
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of the constitutional protections afforded adult defendants. “[H]istory 
has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently 
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure,” 
Justice Abe Fortas lamented.10 Chief among the rights conferred 
upon juvenile defendants was “the guiding hand of counsel.”11 Gault 
was hailed as revolutionary.12 “It will be known as the Magna Carta for 
juveniles,” Chief Justice Warren exclaimed in a note to Fortas.13 
Yet, if two of the Court’s main objectives in Gault were to improve 
procedural fairness and address systemic racial disproportionality in the 
juvenile court, it has not succeeded. In recognition of Gault’s 50th 
Anniversary in 2017, a number of scholars and advocates have 
documented the decision’s procedural shortfalls, exploring Gault’s legal 
context,14 disappointing implementation,15 limited scope,16 and the role 
 
 10. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18. 
 11. Id. at 36 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)); see also Barry C. 
Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. 
REV. 141, 185 n.146 (1984) (discussing the right to counsel in juvenile cases). 
 12. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Alfred G. Walton, Parens Patriae and Statutory 
Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745, 750 & n.36 (1973) (calling Gault 
“revolutionary” (quoting Monrad Paulsen, Children’s Court: Gateway or Last Resort?, 10 
COLUM. U.F. 4 (1967))); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 
22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1970) (predicting that Gault would yield “drastic 
changes in the design and function of juvenile courts”); Murray M. Milton, Post-
Gault: A New Prospectus for the Juvenile Court, 16 N.Y. L.F. 57, 59 (1970) (noting 
support of Gault led to an upheaval in the juvenile court system). 
 13. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: In re Gault 
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 89 (2017). 
 14. See, e.g., Zawadi Baharanyi & Randy Hertz, The Many Stories of In re Gault, in 
RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 3, 4–5 (Kristin Henning et al. eds., 2018) (examining the Supreme Court’s 
civil rights era juvenile justice jurisprudence and the background of Gerald Gault’s 
counsel, Norman Dorsen); Ellen Marrus & Chris Phillis, Arizona Before and After In re 
Gault: Has Arizona Realized the Promises of In re Gault?, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, 
supra, at 20, 22–25 (describing Arizona’s juvenile rights landscape both before and after 
Gault); David S. Tanenhaus & Eric C. Nystrom, Pursuing Gault, 17 NEV. L.J. 351 (2017) 
(tracing the decision’s impact on the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence and 
historical accounts of the evolution of the juvenile court). 
 15. See NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., ACCESS DENIED: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT OF 
STATES’ FAILURE TO PROTECT CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 10 (2017) (documenting 
youths’ limited access to counsel in the juvenile court); Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise 
Revisited: The Search for Due Process, 69 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 49 (2018) (examining whether 
Gault’s efforts to engraft due process protections into the juvenile court have been 
realized); Laura Cohen, The Still-Elusive Promise of In re Gault, 32 CRIM. JUST. 57 (2018) 
(arguing that the modern juvenile court does not fulfill Gault’s promise of counsel); see 
also Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth Continue to 
Pay the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 543, 543 (2009) 
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of the juvenile defender.17 This Article builds upon the work of the 
smaller group of scholars who have contributed to what, until relatively 
recently, was a limited account of race and the juvenile court,18 
 
(examining the “structural, cultural, and systemic barriers that impede access to counsel 
and quality of legal representation for low-income youth”). 
 16. See Laura Cohen & Sandra Simkins, No More “Desert Devil’s Island”: The Right to 
Counsel for Incarcerated Children, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 227, 
231–36 (arguing that Gault should extend to post-conviction); Casey McGowan et al., 
Moving Forward from Gault, CHAMPION, Apr. 2017, at 22, 24 (arguing that Gault should 
extend to pre-trial proceedings); see also Sandra Simkins & Laura Cohen, The Critical 
Role of Post-Disposition Representation in Addressing the Needs of Incarcerated Youth, 8 JOHN 
MARSHALL L.J. 313 (2015) (arguing that “post-dispositional” legal representation for 
youth in long-term custody is a constitutional requirement). 
 17. Nancy Ginsburg, Raising the Bar: Improving the Model of Defense Representation for 
Adolescents Prosecuted in Adult Courts, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 
154, 156–65 (discussing the Legal Aid Society of New York Adolescent, Intervention 
and Diversion Project’s (AID) approach to the representation of youth prosecuted as 
adults); Kristin Henning & Erin Keith, Pride and Prejudice: Juvenile Defenders for Racial 
Justice 50 Years After Gault, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 199 
(chronicling the disparate treatment of non-white youth in the juvenile justice system 
and urging juvenile defenders to explore the roles they may play both in 
perpetuating disparities and promoting meaningful reform); Liz Ryan & Carmen 
Daugherty, Gault at 50: What Juvenile Defenders Can Do to Dismantle the Youth Prison 
Model, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 252 (describing the origins and 
current features of the “youth prison model” and advocating for juvenile defenders 
to play a role in their dismantling); Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to 
Counsel, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (2017) (exploring the ways in which “implicit racial 
bias contributes to paternalism and undermines zealous legal representation of 
children in the juvenile justice system”). 
 18. Until Geoff Ward’s seminal account of the juvenile court’s racialized history, 
THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS, supra note 5, only a handful of scholars had explored the 
evolution of the juvenile court through the prism of race. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, BAD 
KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 162–65 (1999) (arguing 
that procedural reforms helped to legitimate more punitive interventions); Sara Sun 
Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice Reforms as Seen from 
Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.—C.L. L. REV. 511, 525 (2009) (arguing that “the 
Warren Court reforms have little to offer if the problem is—as critics charge—the 
comparatively harsh treatment of [B]lack as opposed to white defendants”); Barry C. 
Feld, Race and the Jurisprudence of Juvenile Justice: A Tale in Two Parts, 1950–2000, in 
OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN 
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 122, 123 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard 
eds., 2005) (arguing that “race has had two distinct and contradictory influences on 
the juvenile court during the second half of the twentieth century”); Feld, supra note 
9, at 1484, 1494 (discussing the Warren Court’s “perceived . . . need . . . to protect 
minority offenders” and desire to make its own contribution to the civil rights 
movement by “focus on procedural rights” as an answer to the country’s profound 
“concern about racial inequality”); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent 
Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 
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documenting the juvenile court’s history of racially disparate treatment,19 
Gault’s response,20 and the decision’s racial implications.21 
We do not minimize the positive impact that Gault did have on 
juvenile court proceedings: Gault initiated the regulation of juvenile 
court decision making, subjected the juvenile court to badly needed 
scrutiny, and most critically, gave children the right to be heard and 
confront the evidence against them in delinquency proceedings. But 
this Article argues that, to the extent Gault was also intended to 
improve juvenile court outcomes for children of color, Gault has not 
just failed; it may have made things worse in three respects. 
First, Gault’s endorsement of a formal and adversarial court process 
for children had the unintended effect of criminalizing both the 
juvenile court and the children who came before it. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, the juvenile court underwent an ideological, jurisprudential, 
procedural, and jurisdictional transformation from a quasi-social welfare 
agency focused on the “best interests” of the child to a second-class 
 
CORNELL L. REV. 383 (2013) (arguing that contemporary narratives of Black and 
Hispanic youth as dangerous and irredeemable lead prosecutors to 
disproportionately reject youth as a mitigating factor for their delinquent behavior). 
 19. See Kristin Henning, The Challenge of Race and Crime in a Free Society: The Racial 
Divide in Fifty Years of Juvenile Justice Reform, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1604, 1614, 1616–17 
(2018) (discussing the racialized origins of the juvenile court and the disparate 
treatment of non-white youth); see also WARD, supra note 5, at 105, 124 (documenting 
Jim Crow juvenile justice and the role that Black reformers played in its dismantling 
and the broader evolution of the American juvenile justice system); Tamar R. 
Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. 
L. REV. 379 (2017) (calling for the diversification of the juvenile court bench and bar 
to enhance fairness and combat the harms of historical and contemporary structural 
racism); Kristin Henning et al., Toward Equal Recognition, Authority, and Protection: 
Legal and Extra-Legal Advocacy for Black Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, in RIGHTS, 
RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 30 (documenting the fight for racial equity in 
the juvenile court in the years before and immediately after Gault). 
 20. Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not 
Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607 (2013) (arguing that “if the Court had been more attentive 
to the disparate treatment of [B]lack children in the juvenile justice system, then it 
would have been more likely to root [Gault] in the Bill of Rights” as it had its other 
criminal procedure reforms). 
 21. BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND 
THE CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 137–44 (2017); see also FELD, supra note 18, at 
162–65 (arguing that procedural reforms helped to legitimate punishment that fell 
disproportionately heavily on minority youth); Feld, supra note 9, at 1484, 1494 
(discussing the Warren Court’s “perceived . . . need . . . to protect minority 
offenders” and desire to make its own contribution to the civil rights movement by 
“focus on procedural rights” as an answer to the country’s profound “concern about 
racial inequality”); Sterling, supra note 20 (arguing that Gault exacerbated the 
disparate treatment of youth of color). 
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criminal court focused on the gravity of the child’s offense.22 By the 
1990s, many states had formally redefined their juvenile courts’ purpose 
clauses, processes, and facilities to deemphasize rehabilitation and 
emphasize public safety and punishment.23 
Second, even as Gault challenged the juvenile court’s compassion, 
fairness, effectiveness, and constitutional vacuity, the Court nonetheless 
declined to consider “the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and 
the state”24 and opted instead for a ruling that was constitutionally tepid, 
paternalistic, and race neutral. Rather than base Gault’s core protections 
in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as it had done for adult 
criminal defendants in Gideon v. Wainwright,25 the Court relied on the 
less rigorous Fourteenth Amendment “fundamental fairness” 
requirement.26 It also declined to address whether Gault’s protections 
should extend to the pre-judicial, dispositional, post-adjudicative, or 
appellate stages of juvenile proceedings.27 The net result was a set of 
constitutional protections that were comparatively weaker than those 
granted criminal defendants. Studies conducted during the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s confirmed that, despite Gault’s mandates, juveniles in many 
states remained unrepresented in delinquency proceedings.28 This 
remains true today. Hundreds of thousands of children appear in juvenile 
court each year without counsel, or with lawyers who are undertrained, 
undersupervised, underpaid, and overworked.29 
Gault’s constitutional timidity also set the stage for the Court’s 
refusal in the decades following Gault to afford youth the full panoply 
of constitutional rights it had granted adults. Just four years after 
 
 22. See FELD, supra note 18, at 162–65 (demonstrating the shift in juvenile rights and 
explaining that in that context, “procedural reforms cannot compensate for the highly 
discretionary substantive standards—‘best interests of the child’ or a ‘serious risk’ of future 
crime—that preclude evenhanded enforcement and lend themselves to discriminatory 
applications”); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Punishment, 
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 877 n.282 (1988). 
 23. See infra Section II.A. 
 24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
 25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 26. Gault, 387 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring); CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 125 (1998); see also Barry C. Feld, A Century of 
Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189 
(2007) (analyzing procedural deficiencies of juvenile courts); Feld, supra note 11 
(comparing and contrasting delinquency and criminal procedural safeguards); 
Sterling, supra note 20, at 633–38. 
 27. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 58. 
 28. See infra Section II.B. 
 29. FELD, supra note 21, at 246-48 (reporting that many, if not most, delinquents 
appeared in juvenile court without counsel); NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., supra note 15, at 10. 
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Gault, the Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania30 that juvenile 
defendants do not have the right to what is arguably the justice 
system’s most important check on state power—trial by jury.31 
Given the Warren Court’s reported concerns about the juvenile 
court’s procedural vacuity and racial inequity, it is also remarkable 
that the decision embraces elements of the “Child Savers’” 
rehabilitation narrative and wholly avoids discussing race.32 Whether 
this is a function of the Court’s efforts to justify its less rigorous 
constitutional standard, a calculated compromise to avoid the type of 
political fallout generated by its school desegregation cases, or the 
Court’s less-than-complete commitment to racial equality in the 
administration of criminal and juvenile justice, Gault’s failure to 
reject outright the juvenile court’s paternalistic and discriminatory 
history left a “significant gap in the fight for racial equality in the 
juvenile justice system.”33 
Finally, one of Gault’s tragic ironies is that even its tepid expansion 
of juvenile court rights was enough to trigger a political backlash that 
legitimated a series of increasingly punitive juvenile laws and 
policies.34 As violent youth crime rates spiked in the late 1970s and 
1980s, calls to “get tough” on juvenile defendants reverberated across 
the country. Branding adolescent lawbreakers “super-predators,”35 
nearly every state in the country enacted laws making it easier to 
prosecute children as adults, expanding criminal court jurisdiction 
 
 30. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 31. Id. at 545. 
 32. See, e.g., ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 
3–4 (1969) (“The child savers viewed themselves as altruists and humanitarians 
dedicated to rescuing those who were less fortunately placed in the social order . . . . 
The child savers went beyond mere humanitarian reforms of existing institutions. 
They brought attention to—and, in doing so, invented—new categories of youthful 
misbehavior which had been hitherto unappreciated.”). The child savers who 
founded the Cook County, Illinois juvenile court were upper and upper-middle class 
women who extended their traditional domestic roles as child-rearers, caretakers, 
and carriers of moral virtue into the public realm. Id. at 75–78; see also FELD, supra 
note 18, at 31–42 (describing the role of women during the Progressive era in 
fostering compulsory education, child labor, and juvenile court reforms to construct 
the new legal institutions of childhood). 
 33. Henning et al., supra note 19, at 33. 
 34. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 22, at 826–28; Feld, supra note 9, at 1484, 1494. 
 35. John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 25, 
1995, at 25–26; see also Gene Koprowski, The Rise of the Teen Super-Predator, WASH. 
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A17 (explaining that “drug use and violence among ‘super-
predators’ are actually caused by moral poverty—that is, the poverty of growing up 
without a loving, responsible parent who can teach right from wrong”). 
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over juvenile cases, weakening confidentiality laws, toughening gang 
laws, and imposing mandatory minimum sentences.36 The number of 
juveniles confined in adult jails and prisons soared.37 
All of these developments hit Black children the hardest. Though 
racial disparities in arrest, charging, detention, disposition, and adult 
court transfer had long been present in the juvenile justice system, 
they spiked in the 1980s and 1990s.38 By the late 1990s, Black youth 
made up 15% of those under eighteen in this country, but nearly 
60% of the youth sentenced to adult prisons.39 The numbers remain 
bleak today.40 There is also evidence that children of color are 
 
 36. See PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996–97 UPDATE (1998), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172835.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PZ4-QCVK]; Barry 
C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & 
JUST. 189 (1998); Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from 
an Ideological Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999). 
 37. According to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the number 
of youth incarcerated in adult jails increased by 208% between 1990 and 2004. 
CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, FACT SHEET: 
YOUTH UNDER AGE 18 IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2006), 
http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/factsheet-youth-in-
adult-system.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ERJ-XHSA]; see also FELD, supra note 21, at 
132–44 (2017) (describing various indicators of greater punitiveness in juvenile 
court sentencing and disparate impact on youths of color); ASHLEY NELLIS, A 
RETURN TO JUSTICE: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO JUVENILES IN THE SYSTEM 51 
(2016); MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 73, 75 
(2011) (discussing mandatory sentencing laws and how they bring about racial 
disparities in the prison system). 
 38. See, e.g., ELEANOR HINTON HOYTT ET AL., 8 PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION 
REFORM: REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION 10 (2001), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/reducing_race.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G4VV-98E7] (documenting the significant increases in racial 
disproportionality in juvenile detention facilities during the 1990s); JOLANTA 
JUSZKIEWICZ, YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME: IS JUSTICE SERVED? (2000), 
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/resource_127.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
A44J-U42W] (providing a study of more than 2500 cases filed in eighteen of the 
largest jurisdictions in the country demonstrated that Black youth were 
disproportionately charged in adult court and were more likely than white or Latino 
youth to receive a sentence of incarceration). 
 39. EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 28 (2000), https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED442882 [https:// 
perma.cc/NQ4S-J5S4]. 
 40. FELD, supra note 21, at 112 (“In the seventy-five largest counties in the United 
States, racial minorities comprised more than two-thirds of juveniles tried in criminal 
court and the vast majority of those sentenced to prison.”). 
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disproportionately denied access to counsel and other basic due 
process protections in the juvenile court.41 
We do not claim, of course, that Gault was solely or even primarily 
responsible for these developments in the juvenile court. But we argue 
that, to the extent Gault’s procedural rights framework was intended to 
serve as a panacea for systemic racial disproportionality in the juvenile 
court, the Warren Court’s seminal juvenile justice decision was as 
misguided as many of its constitutional criminal procedure decisions. 
The primary sources of racial injustice in the juvenile court were then 
what they continue to be today: the over-criminalization, over-policing, 
and over-punishment of juveniles of color;42 the pervasiveness of long-
standing “narratives casting [Black youth] as violent, immoral, 
degenerate, and undeserving of child welfare and social services”;43 and 
the presence of overt and implicit racial biases that drive juvenile 
court decision makers to invoke these narratives when they assess the 
youth who come before them.44 As important as procedural rights 
 
 41. Mary Ann Scali, Being David: The Future of Juvenile Defense and the Goliath of 
Youth Injustice, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 187, 188-89 
(documenting recent Department of Justice efforts in Memphis, Georgia, and St. 
Louis to ensure legal representation for juvenile defendants of color). See generally 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 84-85 (2012) (stating that every year tens of thousands of poor 
defendants go to jail without seeing a lawyer); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE 
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 63-65, 71, 94 (1999) (explaining 
the inadequacies of Gideon); Rebecca Marcus, Note, Racism in Our Courts: The 
Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 219-20, 223 (1994) (arguing that underfunding of public 
defender offices results violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
 42. FELD, supra note 21, at 137–44; see also Donna M. Bishop & Michael J. Leiber, 
Racial and Ethnic Differences in Delinquency and Justice System Responses, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 445, 445 (Barry C. Feld & Donna 
M. Bishop eds., 2012); Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile 
Justice Processing, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 23 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly 
Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005). 
 43. Henning et al., supra note 19, at 31. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, 
THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN 
AMERICA (2010). 
 44. See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of 
Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 
554, 567 (1998) (stating that court officials rely on internal attributes rather than 
severity of crime or criminal history); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming 
Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 499 
(2004) (explaining that disparities in sentencing may be attributable to implicit 
racial bias and stereotypes). 
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may be to institutional fairness and accuracy, even the presence of 
the best-trained, best-funded defense lawyers cannot overcome these 
systemic inequities and pervasive stereotypes. Instead, we argue these 
substantive inequities require substantive policy reforms. 
Part I traces the social, political, and legal contexts within which the 
Warren Court’s constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence 
emerged, beginning with the Great Migration of Black southerners 
from the rural South to the northern and western United States, 
through the early Civil Rights Movement, and culminating in the 
Supreme Court’s efforts to redress racial injustice through the 
expansion of procedural rights.45 It then traces the evolution of the 
American juvenile court over the same period with a focus on the 
nascent system’s paternalistic orientation and its disparate treatment 
of Black youth. Part I concludes with a dissection of Gault itself. 
Part II makes the case that, in an effort to alleviate the juvenile 
court’s racial inequities, the Court unwittingly compounded them. We 
argue that infusing the juvenile court with some, but not all, of the 
criminal procedural rights afforded adults and failing to confront 
directly the juvenile court’s paternalistic and racially discriminatory 
history, triggered the juvenile court’s ideological, jurisprudential, 
procedural, and jurisdictional transformation into a second-class 
criminal court for youth that meted out punishment without the 
protection of its criminal counterpart. It also legitimated a political 
backlash that led to exceptionally punitive juvenile laws and policies. 
Youth of color bore the brunt of these changes. 
Finally, Part III is prescriptive. Triggered by a series of recent Supreme 
Court decisions recognizing that children are constitutionally different 
from adults for purposes of punishment, the juvenile court is once again 
at a pivotal moment. As legislatures and courts across the country 
contemplate reform,46 Gault’s racial legacy is instructive. While we agree 
that shoring up the procedural protections that do exist in the juvenile 
 
 45. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED 
LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991); WARD, 
supra note 5, at 165; Sterling, supra note 20, at 631–34; Joe William Trotter, Jr., 
Introduction to THE GREAT MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: NEW DIMENSIONS OF 
RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER (Joe William Trotter, Jr. ed., 1991). 
 46. See, e.g., CONG. RES. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW 
10, 12, 13, 21 (2019) (stating that the First Step Act provides more procedural 
safeguards for juveniles in the justice system); JUST. POL’Y INST., RAISE THE AGE 2, 4 
(2017) (discussing state legislatures’ decision to raise the age requirement for being 
in adult court). 
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court remains an important mission, we also contend that reformers—
and especially those focused on racial equity—should not lose sight of 
the forest for the trees. Improving outcomes for juvenile defendants of 
color will be best achieved both through added procedural protections 
and especially through substantive policy reforms such as the legalization 
of non-violent adolescent behavior and status offenses, alteration of 
policing policies and increased opportunities for diversion away from the 
juvenile court, mitigated punishment for youths in juvenile and criminal 
courts, and measures to reduce implicit racial bias. 
I.    RACE AND THE ROAD TO GAULT 
The traditional narrative about the Warren Court’s 1967 decision 
in In re Gault is that it was a decision driven by the judiciary’s growing 
disillusion with Progressivism, the rehabilitative ideal, and the 
benevolence of the State.47 While this is true, Gault, like many of the 
Warren Court’s constitutional criminal procedure decisions, was also 
animated by concerns about racial injustice. Issued at the end of the 
Great Migration, in the heart of the Civil Rights Movement, and in the 
shadow of the Court’s seminal decision in Brown v. Board of Education,48 
Gault was a component of the Court’s broader efforts to promote 
racial equality through the expansion of civil rights and due process. 
Curiously, however, the decision itself says nothing about race. 
A.   Race, Civil Rights, and the Supreme Court 
The Great Migration of Black Americans from southern states to 
the northern and western United States during the first two-thirds of 
the twentieth century profoundly changed American society, politics, 
and law. These sociopolitical and legal reverberations were critical 
components of the Court’s decision in Gault. 
1. The Great Migration 
The Great Migration began shortly after the turn of twentieth 
century and took place over the course of three distinct waves. Drawn 
by enhanced employment, education, and housing opportunities, 
and looking to leave behind the Jim Crow laws, extreme segregation, 
overt racial hostility, and white vigilante violence of the rural South, 
more than a million Black Americans left the South in the years after 
 
 47. See generally FELD, supra note 21. 
 48. 347 U.S. 483 (1953). 
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World War I in what would become the first wave of migration.49 The 
country’s entry into World War II, a boom in war production 
industries, widespread labor shortages, and an increased willingness 
by defense contractors to hire Black workers induced a second wave 
in the 1930s and 1940s,50 and a final wave of nearly five million Black 
Americans took place between the end of World War II and 1960.51 
The extent of the demographic shift was extraordinary: in 1910, 90% 
of Black Americans lived in southern states; by 1960, just 50% did.52 
The majority of Black southerners migrated to urban areas in the 
North and the West.53 What they encountered, however, can hardly 
be described as hospitable. While the infamous “Red Summer” of 
1919, in which white mobs laid siege to Black communities 
throughout both the South and North, was the most overt and violent 
manifestation of northern white resistance,54 racial discrimination 
permeated daily life. As Black populations in northern cities began to 
grow in the years after World War II, white people flocked to the 
suburbs.55 The combination of federal housing and highway policies 
further contributed to “white flight” and served to isolate Black 
residents within the major cities.56 During the 1950s and 1960s, urban 
planners fortified residential racial segregation in northern cities by 
consciously locating public housing projects in urban areas and 
steering Black families in their direction.57 Yet, the Great Migration 
also placed the issue of racial inequality on the national political 
agenda, confronted the racist ideology of segregation, and contested 
 
 49. ALEXANDER, supra note 41, at 30–40; FELD, supra note 18, at 84; KLARMAN, 
supra note 45, at 100; LEMANN, supra note 45, at 15; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. 
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 28–
29 (1993); ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF 
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 9, 533–34 (2010). 
 50. FELD, supra note 18, at 83–85; cf. LEMANN, supra note 45, at 21. 
 51. Cf. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO 
THE WAR ON WELFARE 131 (1989); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 18. 
 52. Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
881, 898 (1998). 
 53. In 1870, 80% of Black Americans lived in the rural south; by 1970, 80% 
resided in cities, half in the North, Midwest, and West. See MARTIN GILENS, WHY 
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104–05 (1999); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 18; WARD, supra note 5, at 107. 
 54. Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on Historical Context and Vision, 52 
AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1435–36 (2003). 
 55. KATZ, supra note 51, at 133–37; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 45, 49–52. 
 56. KATZ, supra note 51, at 134–35; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 45–46. 
 57. Feld, supra note 9, at 1513 & n.288. 
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the social construction of racial inferiority,58 which set the stage for 
the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement.59 
2. The emerging Civil Rights Movement 
Even as much of the United States enjoyed post-War affluence and 
growth, Black Americans continued to endure laws and policies that 
sabotaged their economic, educational, and social mobility. During the 
1940s and 1950s, however, resistance began to mount. As Black 
Americans acquired better jobs, higher incomes, and resources with 
which to challenge the racial status quo, a more assertive civil rights 
movement began to emerge to confront the overtly racist Jim Crow 
ideology of the South and the more passive racial hostility of the North.60 
As Black northerners became a more potent political force in key 
states, the constituencies of the respective political parties began to 
reconfigure.61 Divisions within the Democratic Party—between racial 
and social policy liberals and conservatives, and between northerners 
and southerners—emerged.62 In 1948, the Democratic Party convention 
platform for the first time included a strong civil rights plank.63 In 
reaction, then-Democrat South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond 
left the party, ran for president on the States Rights Party—the 
“Dixiecrats”—and foretold the political realignment of the South.64 
In the 1950s, duly enacted Jim Crow laws forced Black southerners 
to attend segregated schools, ride segregated buses, use segregated 
bathrooms, eat at segregated restaurants, and stay at segregated 
hotels.65 Black Americans were also systematically disenfranchised 
 
 58. KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 100, 107–08. 
 59. Feld, supra note 9, at 1461–62. 
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 62. KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 111, 114. 
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AMERICAN POLITICS 40 (1997); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN 
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 64. BECKETT, supra note 63, at 40; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 63, at 34. 
 65. GILENS, supra note 53, at 107. See generally WILKERSON, supra note 49. 
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and excluded from juries.66 Violent extra-legal terrorism reinforced 
racial domination and subordination.67 
Yet, conservative southern Democrats in Congress forcefully resisted 
anti-discrimination laws, voting rights laws, open housing laws, federal 
aid to education, and national health insurance.68 Because a number 
of these were long-serving Democrats who chaired pivotal 
congressional committees, they were able to block laws aimed at 
reducing racial inequality.69 
3. “Discrete and insular minorities” 
As the Civil Rights Movement was emerging, the Supreme Court 
was forced by legislative default to fill the policy void. In 1896, the 
Court had held in Plessy v. Ferguson70 that “separate but equal” 
facilities did not deny Black Americans equal protection of the law 
and remitted racial issues to the states.71 For the next half-century, 
Plessy provided the constitutional foundation for segregated public 
facilities and Jim Crow laws.72 
The Great Migration increased the visibility of racial discrimination 
and highlighted the magnitude of America’s racial dilemma.73 Racial 
segregation and legally enforced inequality were grounded in 
historical theories of racial inferiority that conflicted with American 
ideals of democracy, equality, and justice. Many legislators and jurists 
believed that resolving this hypocrisy required racial integration.74 
During the 1937 to 1938 Term, the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of New Deal laws and distinguished the scope of review 
it would apply to economic legislation—where it gave Congress and 
states broad regulatory authority—from its scrutiny of laws that 
affected individual rights. In the famous Footnote Four of United States 
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 68. See FELD, supra note 18, at 87. 
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 72. See KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 10–13. 
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2020] RACE, RIGHTS, & REPRESENTATION 759 
v. Carolene Products,75 the Court announced that it would review more 
closely state laws that affected political rights and those protections 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.76 The Court proposed using the Equal 
Protection Clause to strictly scrutinize laws that affected the political 
process and racial minorities—“discrete and insular minorities”77—whose 
rights might suffer continually from majoritarian domination.78 
4. The Warren Court 
In 1953, Earl Warren became Chief Justice of the Court and 
quickly began a campaign to end de jure segregation.79 The National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
battled segregation on many fronts, but the most crucial fight was to 
desegregate schools.80 In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Warren Court concluded that separate no longer could be equal.81 
Although Brown ordered states to desegregate schools with “all 
deliberate speed,” southern political leaders denigrated the Court’s 
decision and urged “massive resistance” to judicial usurpation.82 In the 
aftermath of Brown, southern racial moderates virtually disappeared as 
southern politics moved even farther to the right.83 Southern resistance 
to desegregation in the 1950s, Senator Barry Goldwater’s Republican 
presidential campaign in 1964, and George Wallace and Richard 
Nixon’s presidential campaigns in 1968 demonstrated the political 
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 76. Id. at 152 n.4. 
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salience of a racialized Southern Strategy.84 Nonetheless, Brown provided 
strong impetus to pursue other avenues of racial justice. 
By the early 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement was generating 
political momentum. Nationally televised violent attacks on Black 
protesters and Freedom Riders led Congress to pass the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964,85 banning discrimination in schools, employment, and 
public accommodations, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,86 
prohibiting procedures designed to impede Black voters’ exercise of 
the franchise.87 The laws created a national norm—formal legal 
equality—on matters of race to which 70% of the members of Congress 
and the unanimous Supreme Court required the South to conform. 
Concomitant with the Warren Court’s efforts to enforce equality 
norms was its attempt to address racial injustice in the criminal justice 
system.88 Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, Supreme Court cases like 
Moore v. Dempsey,89 Powell v. Alabama,90 and Brown v. Mississippi91 
sporadically used the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to 
review states’ systems of criminal justice administration and protect 
Black Americans against southern injustice.92 Those early decisions 
involved egregious injustices—confessions extracted by torture, mob-
dominated proceedings, sham trials, and the death penalty.93 The 
Court’s oversight of southern states’ criminal proceedings became 
especially important in cases that challenged white supremacy or that 
heightened national visibility of the injustices endured by Black 
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defendants and marked its initial efforts to eradicate regional 
deviation from elementary procedural expectations.94 
During Warren’s tenure as Chief Justice, the Court decided close to 
600 criminal cases.95 Several themes animated its jurisprudence: an 
emphasis on individual liberty and equality, distrust of state power, an 
unwillingness to rely on officials’ benevolent motives, and recognition 
that discretionary decisions in the administration of justice adversely 
affected racial minorities.96 The Court used three strategies—
incorporation, reinterpretation, and equal protection—to decide 
state criminal procedure cases.97 First, it used the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause to incorporate specific provisions of 
the Bill of Rights and apply them to the states, which allowed the 
Court to establish a minimum requirement of fairness in criminal 
trials.98 Second, it reinterpreted those provisions broadly to expand 
constitutional rights and exercise greater oversight over state 
officials.99 Finally, it used the Equal Protection Clause to redress 
imbalances between white and non-white and rich and poor 
defendants in states’ criminal justice systems.100 
Decisions such as Mapp v. Ohio,101 establishing the exclusionary 
rule, and Miranda v. Arizona,102 mandating warning prior to custodial 
interrogation, expanded defendants’ rights, restricted police power, 
and provided a remedy for constitutional violations. These decisions 
elicited hostile criticism from law enforcement officials, conservative 
politicians, and the public.103 While earlier criminal decisions like 
Powell, Moore, and Brown involved egregious injustice and veiled 
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discussions of race, by the mid-1960s, many whites viewed the Court’s 
decisions as overtly racial because of their concurrence with urban 
conflicts and rising crime rates.104 
Yet, it is notable that the signature cases of the Warren Court’s 
criminal procedure revolution contain virtually no discussion of 
racial issues.105 Even Duncan v. Louisiana,106 which involved a Black 
defendant who was sentenced to sixty days in jail for touching a white 
youth on the arm as the defendant attempted to prevent a fight, held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury applied to defendants 
in state proceedings without mentioning the underlying racial 
components of the case.107 
B.   Race, Paternalism, and the Juvenile Court 
In parallel with the Great Migration and the emerging Civil Rights 
Movement, the American juvenile court became a fixture in all fifty 
states. Despite its nominally benevolent purposes, however, it quickly 
became evident that juvenile court decisions were often arbitrary and 
harsh, especially for Black children. By the 1960s, disillusionment 
with the juvenile court’s unbridled discretion and lack of procedural 
safeguards became widespread. 
1. The rehabilitative ideal 
The nation’s first juvenile court was established in Cook County, 
Illinois in 1899, a decade before the start of the Great Migration.108 
Prompted by the prevailing Progressive philosophy that children were 
vulnerable and dependent beings in need of special care and 
protection, the juvenile justice system was created as a social welfare 
alternative to the criminal justice system.109 The juvenile court 
eschewed criminal elements, characterized its proceedings as civil, 
 
 104. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
42, 71 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 
63, at 74–77; GILENS, supra note 53, at 107–10. 
 105. Beale, supra note 18, at 527. 
 106. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 107. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146, 147, 162. See generally Nancy J. King, Duncan v. 
Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal Regulation of State Juries, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 272 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). 
 108. See C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and 
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 667 (2005). 
 109. See FELD, supra note 18, at 60–67; see also Clarke, supra note 108, at 662–65 
(observing that the Progressives’ approach to juvenile delinquency represented a 
departure from the Colonial belief that parents and educators “were free to use 
whatever means they deemed appropriate to correct misbehaving children”). 
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and replaced lawyers and juries with social service personnel, 
probation officers, and clinicians.110 Courtroom vocabulary shifted 
accordingly: a petition in the welfare of the child commenced a 
proceeding rather than a criminal charge; judges adjudicated a youth 
to be delinquent rather than criminal; and they imposed dispositions 
rather than sentences.111 Court proceedings abandoned formal rules 
of evidence and procedure in favor of broad judicial discretion.112 
Maximum flexibility and informality, it was thought, would best 
enable the states to carry out their role as parens patriae.113 
From its Progressive origins until the early 1970s, the Rehabilitative 
Ideal emphasized treatment to promote juveniles’ well-being and 
provided the intellectual framework, cultural vocabulary, and shared 
understandings that animated criminal and juvenile justice 
professionals.114 The rehabilitative enterprise focused on the 
individual child and relied on judges and professionals to make 
welfare-oriented decisions in the child’s “best interests.”115 While 
traditional accounts of the juvenile court’s early years attribute 
benevolent motives to its founders, most modern accounts portray 
Progressives as wealthy Anglo-Protestants who envisioned the juvenile 
court as a vehicle through which to exercise social control over Black 
and immigrant youth.116 
 
 110. See FELD, supra note 18, at 62, 68–69; Feld, supra note 9, at 1458–59. 
 111. See FELD, supra note 18, at 68. 
 112. See Clarke, supra note 108, at 668 (noting that “courts were given maximum 
discretion to allow for flexibility in diagnosis and treatment”). 
 113. See FELD, supra note 18, at 52 (noting that parens patriae, a legal doctrine with 
origins in English chancery courts to protect the Crown’s interests in feudal 
succession, provided the rationale for the state to substitute its own control over 
children if their parents failed to meet their responsibilities); Neil Howard Cogan, 
Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of “Parens Patriae”, 22 S.C. L. REV. 147, 147 
(1970); George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or 
Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 895 (1976); Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: 
From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 205 (1971). 
 114. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 27 (2001). 
 115. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 53–61 (1980); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, Legal Values 
and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW 
AND CRIMINOLOGY 25, 26–29, 35–39, 41 (1964). 
 116. See, e.g., Henning et al., supra note 19, at 30, 32–34 (documenting the fight 
for racial equity in the juvenile court in the years before and immediately after 
Gault); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3, 6, 10–
11, 13 (2d ed. 1977). 
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2. Jim Crow juvenile justice 
From its earliest days, Black children were overpunished and 
underserved in the juvenile court.117 Northern Progressive reformers 
were simply not focused on the rehabilitation of “Negro” youth, 
Geoff Ward notes.118 Black youth were a “perennial ‘lost cause[]’ . . . 
lacking the physical, moral, and intellectual capacity on which 
normalization would depend.”119 
In Chicago’s nascent juvenile court, data suggests that while Black 
and white children committed similar offenses, Black youth were sent 
to the more punitive state-run reformatory, St. Charles School for 
Boys, “sooner than [they] would have in the cases of Jewish, Italian, 
or Polish children.”120 Within child welfare facilities and correctional 
institutions, racial segregation was pervasive. Black children were 
routinely excluded from refuge homes in northern cities, and those 
that did allow Black youth, often relegated them to the “colored 
section.”121 While white youth in juvenile court placements received 
academic instruction and vocational training, Black children received 
little, if any, education and were trained exclusively for manual labor 
or low-level service jobs.122 
In the Jim Crow South, Black youth fared far worse. “Southern 
governments were generally slow to embrace juvenile justice reforms 
and were especially disinclined to recognize [B]lack youths or 
community interests in citizen-building narratives, during or after 
slavery.”123 Most southern states tried Black children in criminal 
courts, committed them to prisons, subjected them to chain gangs, 
and leased them as “convicts.”124 In 1910, over 80% of Black youths 
charged with offenses in the South were committed to adult 
correctional facilities.125 
By the 1960s, racial disparities in the juvenile court became part of 
the national dialogue. A survey conducted contemporaneously with 
Gault by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
 
 117. Sterling, supra note 20, at 627–28. 
 118. See WARD, supra note 5, at 113-14. 
 119. Id. at 39. 
 120. Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the 
Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. REV. 379, 400 (2017) (quoting DAVID S. TANENHAUS, 
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 38 (2004)). 
 121. WARD, supra note 5, at 53. 
 122. Id. at 52–53. 
 123. Id. at 60. 
 124. Id. at 11. 
 125. Id. at 98. 
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Administration of Justice reported that in the vast majority of juvenile 
courts in the country, non-white juveniles comprised 40% of the 
youth who came before them.126 Separate studies found that Black 
youth brought before the juvenile court were younger, had fewer 
prior appearances, committed fewer and less serious crimes, but 
received probation less often than their white counterparts.127 
3. Progressive disillusion 
By the 1920s, the juvenile court’s absence of procedural protections was 
raising concern among advocates and academics. In 1913, Roscoe 
Pound lamented that “the powers of the Star Chamber were a 
bagatelle” compared to the juvenile courts,128 a phrase that was 
repeated by Professor Herbert Lou a decade later.129 In 1946, Paul 
Tappan condemned the juvenile courts as “treatment without 
trial.”130 Despite these calls for reform, juvenile courts evaded serious 
scrutiny until the 1960s.131 
In 1964, Chief Justice Earl Warren addressed the National Council 
of Juvenile Court Judges and identified several procedural 
protections that juvenile courts lacked—lawyers, a fair hearing, and a 
framework of law to provide a check on unbridled caprice.132 In 1966, 
the Warren Court stepped in for the first time, holding in Kent v. 
United States133 that juvenile courts must provide procedural 
safeguards in transfer hearings.134 “There is evidence, in fact, that 
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of 
 
 126. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 80 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
 127. See, e.g., Sidney Axelrad, Negro and White Male Institutionalized Delinquents, 57 
AM. J. SOC. 569, 569–71 (1952); Sterling, supra note 20, at 632–33. 
 128. Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in a Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 
302, 322 (1913). 
 129. LOU, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting Pound, supra note 128, at 322). 
 130. Tappan, supra note 6, at 307–08; see also Beemsterboer, supra note 6, at 475 
(arguing that the juvenile court when it relies on informal observations “is merely a 
euphemism for the star chamber”). 
 131. NELLIS, supra note 37, at 21; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55 (1967); TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 126, at 1; Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: 
Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7, 12–26 (1965); Monrad G. Paulsen, 
The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233; David 
R. Barrett et al., Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized 
Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1966). 
 132. FELD, supra note 18, at 99. 
 133. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 134. Id. at 556–57; Paulsen, supra note 131, at 252. 
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both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults 
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for 
children,” the Court lamented.135 
At the same time, the politics of race and crime were precipitating 
a shift in criminal justice policies from the belief that penal measures 
should rehabilitate and promote positive change to an increasingly 
punitive orientation.136 Liberal critics continued to characterize 
individualized treatment in the juvenile court as a paternalistic veneer 
that masked coercive social control and oppressed the poor, the young, 
and minorities.137 They also criticized judges and social workers whose 
discretionary decisions resulted in unequal treatment of similarly 
situated defendants and questioned the State’s ability to deal justly with 
its most vulnerable citizens.138 Conservative critics perceived a crisis in 
rising crime rates, civil rights protests, and urban race rebellions; 
advocated for law and order; and favored repression over 
rehabilitation.139 These developments laid the groundwork for Gault. 
C.   In re Gault 
In re Gault was reportedly a product of the Warren Court’s efforts 
to enhance the juvenile court’s procedural safeguards and curb what 
had become overwhelming evidence of racial injustice. Curiously, 
however, the Gault Court said nothing about race. Nor did it fully 
reject the juvenile court’s Progressive origins. 
1. Procedural formality 
The underlying facts of In re Gault were central to the Court’s 
decision. In 1964, police in Globe, Arizona took a white fifteen-year-
old named Gerald Gault into custody for allegedly making a 
telephone call of the “irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety.”140 
Police held him overnight without notifying his parents, and the next 
day, a juvenile court judge held an informal hearing to consider a 
 
 135. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556. 
 136. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY 
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 25–30 (1981); GARLAND, supra note 114, at 13; MARIE 
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146 (2015). 
 137. GARLAND, supra note 114, at 55. 
 138. ALLEN, supra note 136, at 87–88; GARLAND, supra note 114, at 36. 
 139. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 63, at 49–52. 
 140. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). The offending words allegedly included: 
“Are your cherries ripe? Do you have big bombers? Do you give any away?” 
TANENHAUS, supra note 13, at 32. 
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delinquency petition that simply alleged Gault needed care and 
custody.141 The judge questioned Gault about the telephone call, 
which he admitted dialing, but insisted a companion spoke the 
offending words.142 No witnesses testified, and there was no transcript 
or record of the proceeding.143 No steps were taken to advise Gault or 
his parents of his right to remain silent or to counsel, and the court 
did not provide an attorney.144 A week later, the judge committed 
Gault to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority 
[that is, until 21], unless sooner discharged by due process of law.”145 
A judge could have sentenced an adult convicted of the same crime 
to a $50 fine or two months’ imprisonment, rather than confinement 
of up to six years.146 
In its 1967 decision, the Supreme Court identified two fatal 
disjunctions between juvenile justice rhetoric and reality: the theory 
versus practice of rehabilitation and the expanded procedural 
safeguards afforded criminal defendants compared with the meager 
protections juveniles received. Although juvenile courts’ Progressive 
founders and Dean Roscoe Pound aspired to exceptionally well-
qualified judges—mature, wise, sophisticated, and versed in law and 
social sciences—the President’s Crime Commission reported that 
“half had not received undergraduate degrees; a fifth had received 
no college education at all; a fifth were not members of the bar . . . . 
and judicial hearings often are little more than attenuated interviews 
of 10 or 15 minutes’ duration.”147 In addition, nearly all juveniles 
appeared before judges without counsel. A survey of 207 juvenile 
courts serving populations of 100,000 or more reported that lawyers 
accompanied juveniles in 40% or more of cases in only 5% of courts, 
and that counsel appeared in more than 20% of delinquency cases 
only 15% of the time.148 
Gault reviewed the juvenile court’s historical justifications for 
omitting procedural safeguards: the proceedings were civil rather 
than criminal; juveniles received treatment rather than punishment; 
and when the State acted as parens patriae, the child was entitled to 
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custody rather than liberty.149 It noted that absence of procedures often 
resulted in judicial arbitrariness rather than “careful, compassionate, 
individualized treatment.”150 Youths could not challenge judges’ 
discretion even when they imposed punitive sanctions because most 
juvenile court statutes did not authorize appeals.151 Gault did not reject 
juvenile courts’ rehabilitative goals, but emphasized their high rates of 
recidivism; the stigma of a delinquency label; access to court records 
granted to military, law enforcement, and employers; and arbitrary 
decision making as reasons to require procedural safeguards.152 The 
Court also examined the institutions in which states purported to treat 
juveniles, described them as quasi-penal places of confinement, and 
concluded that “[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a 
boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”153 
Gault ruled that juvenile courts must conduct fundamentally fair 
proceedings, which necessarily include notice of charges, an 
impartial hearing, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the assistance of counsel.154 However, the Court did not 
address juveniles’ rights prior to trial—at intake and detention—or 
after trial—at disposition and post-disposition—but rather focused 
exclusively on the adjudication of guilt or innocence.155 The Court 
also declined to address whether Gault’s protections extended to the 
appellate stages of juvenile proceedings.156 “We do not in this opinion 
consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the 
totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state,” Justice Fortas 
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noted.157 “We do not even consider the entire process relating to 
juvenile ‘delinquents.’”158 
As in several of its other constitutional criminal procedure decisions, 
the Warren Court endorsed adversarial procedures both to ensure the 
factual accuracy of court proceedings and to limit the state’s power to 
punish.159 One of the purposes of the privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court noted, “is to prevent the state, whether by 
force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and 
will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the 
freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his 
conviction.”160 The Warren Court’s commitment to “revitaliz[ing] the 
adversary process in those parts of the system in which it was supposed 
to flourish” and “extend[ing] the adversary process into areas of the 
system in which, theretofore, adversary proceedings were unknown or 
rarely employed” was one of its most distinctive tendencies.161 
2. Fundamental fairness 
However, unlike its 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, in which 
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused 
the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and 
requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire 
counsel unless the right was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived,162 Gault based the rights to notice, counsel, and confrontation 
not on the Sixth Amendment, but on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process requirement of fundamental fairness.163 The Arizona 
Supreme Court had used the same fundamental fairness approach 
when it rejected Gerald Gault’s pleas for procedural protections.164 
The distinctions between the Fourteenth Amendment fundamental 
fairness standard and Sixth Amendment fundamental rights standard 
are marked. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; . . . 
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and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”165 By contrast, 
Fourteenth Amendment “[d]ue process of law requires notice of the 
sort we have described—that is, notice which would be deemed 
constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding.”166 
Although Gault deemed delinquency proceedings “comparable in 
seriousness to a felony prosecution,” it nonetheless afforded juveniles 
fewer procedural protections than adults.167 
Justice Hugo Black concurred in Gault, but argued that juveniles 
should receive the same criminal procedural safeguards that the Bill 
of Rights guarantees for adults, rather than what he called a “watered-
down” judicial version of fairness embodied in generic notions of due 
process.168 Importantly, both the Gault majority and Black’s 
concurring opinion assumed that juveniles were competent to 
exercise their newly-granted rights in conjunction with counsel.169 
The Court recognized that providing counsel and other safeguards 
could make proceedings more adversarial and complex, but 
concluded that juveniles needed “advocates to speak for them and 
guard their interests.”170 
3. Paternalism and racial neutrality 
As a number of scholars have noted, there is considerable evidence 
that the Warren Court’s 1967 decision in In re Gault, like the Court’s 
other criminal procedure cases of the era, was intended to address 
institutional racism in the juvenile court.171 Decided at “the peak of 
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the civil rights period,” both Gideon and Gault “arguably served as an 
important legal corollary to the civil rights struggle against racial 
discrimination as they appeared to be concerned about the way 
[B]lack defendants were being treated in the criminal and juvenile 
justice systems.”172 
It is surprising, then, that Gault is entirely race-neutral. Gerald 
Gault was a white juvenile living in the southwestern United States. In 
theory, the Court could have, but did not, select as its vehicle to 
reshape the juvenile court one of any number of cases involving the 
arbitrary and cruel treatment of a Black juvenile in the South. 
Indeed, despite the Warren Court’s reported and apparent concern 
about racial injustice, race was almost never explicitly discussed in its 
criminal procedure and juvenile justice opinions.173 
It is also curious that, despite its disenchantment with Progressivism, 
the Court embraced aspects of the traditional “Child Savers” narrative. 
Progressives were “appalled by adult procedures and penalties,” the 
Court noted, and “profoundly convinced that society’s duty to the child 
could not be confined by the concept of justice alone.”174 “On the one 
hand, the Court assailed the then-current juvenile system as a ‘kangaroo 
court,’” Robin Walker Sterling writes, while “[o]n the other hand, 
despite the Court’s full-throated rebuke,” the Court adopted the 
Child Savers’ rehabilitation story as a basis to rely on Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental fairness, and not fundamental rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.175 Whether the Warren Court’s 
reluctance to reject the juvenile court’s paternalistic and racially 
discriminatory history in its seminal juvenile justice decision was 
driven by fear of another Brown-type political backlash, a strategic 
commitment to employing a less rigorous constitutional standard 
than it had in Gideon, or a waning commitment to achieving racial 
equality in the administration of criminal and juvenile justice, these 
omissions would prove consequential. 
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II.    RACE AND PUNISHMENT IN THE POST-GAULT ERA 
One of Gault’s great ironies may be that, in an effort to alleviate the 
juvenile court’s racial inequities, the Court may have unwittingly 
compounded them. By endorsing an adversarial court process for 
children and engrafting into the juvenile court some, but not all, of the 
procedural rights afforded to adults, the Court unwittingly triggered the 
juvenile court’s ideological, jurisprudential, procedural, jurisdictional, 
and penal transformation into a second-class criminal court for youth 
that meted out punishment without the protection of its criminal 
counterpart. By any measure, these changes disproportionately 
disadvantaged youth of color. 
A.   Procedural Formality and Institutional Convergence 
When it was established in 1899, the purpose of the juvenile court 
was “to secure for each minor . . . such care and guidance . . . as will 
serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor 
and the best interests of the community.”176 By the early 1990s, 
however, about one-quarter of the states had redefined their juvenile 
courts’ purpose clauses to deemphasize rehabilitation and emphasize 
public safety,177 children’s obligations to society,178 retributive 
sanctions,179 and punishment.180 
These changes were the product of a broader ideological shift that 
took place in the 1970s and 1980s.181 In 1979, for example, the 
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Washington Supreme Court rationalized a newly retributive purpose 
clause on the grounds that “accountability for criminal behavior, the 
prior criminal activity and punishment commensurate with age, crime 
and criminal history does as much to rehabilitate . . . an errant youth as 
does the prior philosophy of focusing upon . . . characteristics of the 
individual juvenile.”182 Four years later, the Nevada Supreme Court 
explicitly embraced punishment as a valid objective of the juvenile court, 
explaining that “[b]y formally recognizing the legitimacy of punitive 
and deterrent sanctions for criminal offenses[,] juvenile courts will be 
properly and somewhat belatedly expressing society’s firm 
disapproval of juvenile crime and will be clearly issuing a threat of 
punishment for criminal acts to the juvenile population.”183 
Gault also opened the door for additional Supreme Court decisions 
that further increased juvenile courts’ procedural formality. In 1970, 
in In re Winship,184 the Court held that the State must prove 
delinquency by the criminal standard—beyond a reasonable doubt—
rather than by the lower civil standard of proof—preponderance of 
the evidence.185 Five years later in Breed v. Jones,186 the Court held that 
the double jeopardy protection of the Fifth Amendment barred 
criminal prosecution of a youth whom a juvenile court previously 
found delinquent for the same crime.187 Breed found that policies that 
underlay the double jeopardy prohibition applied equally to 
delinquency and criminal prosecutions.188 
While Winship and Breed plainly brought important procedural 
protections to the juvenile court, this jurisprudence, in combination 
with subsequent Court decisions and federal and state legislation, had 
the cumulative effect of criminalizing the juvenile court’s day-to-day 
practices. Prior to Gault, for example, probation officers presented 
juveniles’ cases in court and recommended dispositions; after Gault, 
juveniles were given the right to counsel, and states introduced 
prosecutors to off-set defense lawyers’ presence.189 Since prosecutors 
 
 182. State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (Wash. 1979) (en banc); see also State v. 
Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 242 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (detailing that changes in 
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 183. In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (Nev. 1983). 
 184. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 185. Id. at 368. 
 186. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). 
 187. Id. at 541. 
 188. Id. at 531. 
 189. Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics for Contemporary 
Reforms, in CHOOSING FOR THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 216, 232 (Franklin 
E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014); see also FELD, supra note 21. 
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had been socialized in criminal courts to maximize convictions and 
sentences, they began to import those norms into juvenile courts.190 
These changes also made the juvenile court more hospitable to the 
“get tough” laws that followed. 
Finally, the juvenile court also underwent two significant jurisdictional 
changes in the years after Gault. Status offenses, such as truancy or 
incorrigibility, were removed from juvenile court jurisdiction in a number 
of states, and, as discussed later, an increasingly large number of youth 
and offenses were subjected to criminal court jurisdiction.191 Historically, 
the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over status offenses to prevent 
low-level misconduct from escalating into criminality.192 Children 
adjudicated delinquent as status offenders were detained and 
incarcerated in the same institutions as those adjudicated for criminal 
offenses.193 During the 1970s and 1980s, federal legislation along with 
three state-level, administrative trends—diversion, deinstitutionalization, 
and decriminalization—led to the removal of many so-called “status 
offenders” from the juvenile court.194 While plainly warranted,195 this shift 
had the effect of limiting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional authority to 
children who committed crimes and “privatizing” the treatment of 
middle-class status offenders.196 
Even more significant were the jurisdictional shifts that took hold 
during 1980s and 1990s. During this era, the juvenile court relinquished 
jurisdiction over thousands of youth, not to facilitate rehabilitation and 
protection, but to exact retribution and punishment.197 
 
 
 190. Zimring & Tanenhaus, supra note 189, at 232. 
 191. See infra Section II.C; see also Feld, supra note 2, at 696–708 (explaining 
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OF THE CHILD 4 (1989) (discussing the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
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 194. Feld, supra note 191, at 697; see also FELD, supra note 18, at 173–79 (describing 
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B.   Fundamental Fairness and Illusory Protection 
One of Gault’s great paradoxes is that, even as it decried the 
juvenile court’s procedural vacuity, it opted for a tepid constitutional 
framework that undermined its own mandates in several ways. First, 
Gault’s failure to create a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for 
children opened the door for the Court’s 1971 decision in McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, which held that juveniles do not have the constitutional 
right to a jury trial.198 Despite a ruling in 1968 in Duncan v. 
Louisiana,199 which held the Sixth Amendment guaranteed adults the 
right to a jury trial in state criminal proceedings,200 McKeiver held that 
Fourteenth Amendment due process required only accurate fact-
finding, which, the Court believed a juvenile court judge could do as 
well as a jury. The Court did not articulate its rationale for rejecting 
the approach it had used in Duncan beyond asserting that juvenile 
court cases were not criminal prosecutions.201 Granting juveniles a jury 
trial “will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process 
and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of 
an intimate, informal protective proceeding,” the Court cautioned.202 
As several scholars have noted, McKeiver denied juveniles what is 
arguably the most important check against prosecutorial overreach.203 
Second, Gault’s failure to confer a constitutional right to appellate 
review insulated juvenile court judges from oversight.204 Evidence 
suggests that adult defense lawyers appeal criminal cases about ten 
times more often than juvenile defenders.205 There are myriad 
explanations: juvenile court culture, even among public defenders, 
may discourage appeals as an impediment to a youth assuming 
 
 198. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); see also Sterling, supra note 20, 
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responsibility; overwhelming caseloads make specialized appellate 
divisions a luxury few defender offices can afford; the vast majority of 
juveniles enter guilty pleas, which waive the right to appeal and 
further precludes appellate review; juveniles who waived counsel at 
trial will be less aware of or able to pursue an appeal; and the short 
length of most juvenile dispositions renders many appealed cases 
moot if the child is released before a court reviews the case.206 As one 
troubled state Supreme Court observed, “We cannot help but notice 
that the children’s cases appealed to this court have often shown 
much more extensive and fundamental error than is generally found 
in adult criminal cases . . . .”207 
The lack of appeals from juvenile courts also retards the 
development of substantive law. Appellate courts can only rule if 
parties present issues to them. If defense counsel does not challenge 
judges’ decisions, then appellate courts cannot develop a body of case 
law. The dearth of substantive law undermines attorneys’ views of 
juvenile courts as courts of law, discourages their presence, and limits 
the arguments available to creative advocates.208 
Third, given the relative impotence of the Fourteenth Amendment 
standard and the absence of two of the justice system’s most 
fundamental checks on state power—trial by jury and appeal—it is 
not surprising that Gault’s right to counsel is woefully underenforced. 
When the Court decided Gault, lawyers appeared in fewer than 5% of 
delinquency cases.209 A study attributed the absence of counsel to 
“juvenile court judges’ actively discouraging juveniles from retaining 
counsel and . . . [to] the inability of attorneys to perform their 
traditional role in juvenile courts.”210 Although states amended their 
juvenile codes to comply with Gault, evaluations of initial compliance 
found that most judges did not advise juveniles of their rights, and 
the vast majority did not appoint counsel.211 Research in Minnesota in 
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the mid-1980s, for example, reported that most youths appeared 
without counsel, that rates of representation varied widely in urban, 
suburban, and rural counties, and that one-third of youths removed 
from home and one-quarter of those in institutions were 
unrepresented.212 Similarly, a 1988 study of delivery of legal services 
in six states reported that only three of them appointed counsel for a 
substantial majority of juveniles,213 and in 1995, the General 
Accounting Office confirmed that rates of representation varied 
widely among and within states and that judges tried and sentenced 
many unrepresented youths.214 
In the mid-1990s, the American Bar Association (ABA) published 
two reports on juveniles’ legal needs. One report, America’s Children at 
Risk, illustrated that many children appeared without counsel and 
that lawyers who represented youth lacked adequate training and 
often failed to provide effective assistance.215 The other report, A Call 
for Justice, focusing on the quality of defense lawyers, again reported 
that many youths appeared without counsel, and that many attorneys 
failed to appreciate the challenges of representing young clients.216 
Since the late 1990s, the ABA and the National Juvenile Defender 
Center (NJDC) have conducted more than twenty state-by-state 
 
Implementation, 3 L. & SOC’Y REV. 491, 517–24, 530–37 (1969). See generally WILLIAM 
VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE 
ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS (1972) (examining the impact of 
lawyers representing juveniles and positing that a lawyer’s effectiveness is dependent 
on hearing structure and court personnel). 
 212. Feld, supra note 22, at 871–75; Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile 
Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1199–200 (1989); see also FELD, supra note 148, at 54–
56; Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile 
Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156 (1991). 
 213. Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right to 
Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 400–01 (1988) (reporting that only 
three of six states studied appointed counsel for a majority of youths). 
 214. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-139, JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
REPRESENTATION RATES VARIED AS DID COUNSEL’S IMPACT ON COURT OUTCOMES (1995). 
 215. AM. BAR ASS’N, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL 
ACTION 60 (1993); see also Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal 
Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re 
Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 142–47, 142 n.105 (2007) (discussing the right to 
counsel and the difficulties of understanding court processes without a lawyer). 
 216. PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N JUV. JUST. CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 52–56 (1995) [hereinafter A CALL FOR JUSTICE], https://static.prisonpolicy. 
org/scans/aba/cfjfull.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TJB-URBW. 
778 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:743 
assessments of access to and quality of counsel.217 The NJDC’s 2017 
study reports that, though every state has a basic structure to provide 
attorneys for children at the adjudication phase of delinquency 
proceedings, few juvenile defendants actually have meaningful access 
to counsel.218 Recent research reveals that only eleven states provide a 
court-appointed lawyer to every child charged with a delinquency 
defense regardless of financial status,219 just one state provides lawyers 
for some children arrested for serious crimes during interrogation,220 
only eleven provide meaningful access to lawyers at post-adjudication,221 
thirty-six states charge fees for court-appointed lawyers,222 and forty-
three states allow children to waive their right to counsel without first 
consulting with an attorney.223 
Several factors account for lack of representation in juvenile court. 
Public defender services may be less available in non-urban areas.224 
Judges may give cursory advisories of the right to counsel, imply that 
waivers are just legal technicalities, and readily find waivers to ease 
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their administrative burdens.225 If judges expect to impose non-
custodial sentences, then they may dispense with counsel.226 Some 
jurisdictions charge fees to determine a youth’s eligibility for a public 
defender, and others base youths’ eligibility on their parents’ 
income.227 Parents may be reluctant to retain or accept an attorney if, 
as in many states, they may be required to reimburse attorney fees if 
they can afford them.228 
By far, the most common explanation for underrepresentation, 
however, is waiver of counsel.229 Gault required judges to advise 
juveniles and their parents of the right to have a lawyer appointed if 
they were indigent, but also held that juveniles could waive counsel.230 
In 2013, the National Academy of Sciences reported that “[i]n 
Louisiana, as many as 90 percent of youth waived their right to 
counsel . . . , and in many other states, including Florida, Georgia, 
and Kentucky, more than 50 percent of youth waived that right.”231 
Despite this, most states do not use special procedural safeguards—
mandatory nonwaivable appointment or prewaiver consultation with 
a lawyer, for example—to protect juveniles from improvident waiver 
decisions.232 Instead, they use the adult waiver standard—knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary—to gauge juveniles’ relinquishment of 
counsel. Because this is also the standard that the Court in Fare v. 
Michael C.233 endorsed to gauge juveniles’ Miranda waivers of 
counsel,234 criminological studies and developmental research on 
Miranda waivers generalize to juveniles’ counsel waivers as well.235 As 
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with Miranda, formal equality between juveniles and adults results in 
practical inequality—lawyers represent juveniles at much lower rates 
than they do criminal defendants.236 
Moreover, many juveniles do not understand their rights or the 
role of lawyers and waive counsel without consulting with either a 
parent or an attorney.237 And even youths who understand the 
counsel advisory’s words may be unable to exercise rights in a 
meaningful way238 because they do not appreciate the function or 
importance of rights as well as adults.239 Although judges are 
supposed to conduct a dialogue with youth to determine whether a 
child can understand rights and represent herself in juvenile court, 
they frequently fail to give delinquents any counsel advisory, often 
neglect to create a record, and readily accept waivers from manifestly 
incompetent children.240 Juveniles’ diminished competence, inability 
to understand proceedings, and judicial encouragement to waive 
counsel result in larger proportions of juveniles adjudicated without 
lawyers than adult defendants.241 
In addition, like adult criminal defendants, the overwhelming 
majority of juvenile defendants admit to charges.242 Because most 
states deny juveniles the right to a jury trial, they have very little plea 
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bargaining leverage.243 Even though admitting to a charge is perhaps 
the most critical decision a juvenile defendant makes, states use adult 
standards to evaluate their competence to enter a plea.244 Because 
appellate courts seldom review juveniles’ waivers of counsel, pleas 
made without counsel receive even less judicial scrutiny.245 
Finally, it is worth noting that some studies have found that 
juveniles appearing with counsel fare worse at disposition in certain 
situations than those without.246 A recent meta-analysis evaluating the 
impact of counsel on dispositions, for example, concluded that youth 
represented by attorneys were more than twice as likely to receive out-
of-home placements as those without counsel.247 There are myriad 
explanations for these findings: judges may be more likely to appoint 
attorneys when they anticipate more severe sentences;248 juveniles’ 
developmental limitations and incomplete understanding of a 
lawyer’s role may undermine the lawyer’s ability to represent them 
effectively;249 lawyers assigned to juvenile court may not be fully 
trained to litigate juvenile court cases and make dispositional 
arguments;250 a lack of adequate funding for defender services may 
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preclude investigations, which increases the risk of wrongful 
convictions;251 and juvenile courts’ parens patriae ideology may 
discourage “zealous advocacy” and engender adverse consequences 
for attorneys who “rock the boat.”252 
There is also the reality that many defense attorneys work under 
conditions that create structural impediments to quality 
representation.253 Observations and qualitative assessments in dozens 
of states report derisory working conditions—crushing caseloads, 
penurious compensation, scant support services, inexperienced 
attorneys and inadequate supervision—that detract from or preclude 
effective representation.254 Not surprisingly, ineffective assistance of 
counsel correlates with heightened risks of false confessions,255 
wrongful convictions,256 placement in secure detention,257 and the 
imposition of collateral consequences.258 None of this is to say that 
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 257. WILLIAM ECENBARGER, KIDS FOR CASH: TWO JUDGES, THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN, 
AND A $2.8 MILLION KICKBACK SCHEME 248–49 (2012); see also Robert G. Schwartz & 
Marsha Levick, When a “Right” Is Not Enough: Implementation of the Right to Counsel in an 
Age of Ambivalence, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 365, 367 (2010) (citing data from the 
Juvenile Law Center showing that lack of counsel correlates with out-of-home detention). 
 258. See FELD, supra note 21, at 268–70 (noting that delinquency convictions can 
result in extensive collateral consequences that can affect housing, education, and 
professional licensure and employment opportunities; record sharing with other 
government agencies; loss of driving privilege; sex offender registration; and other 
similar repercussions); JOSHUA ROVNER, SENTENCING PROJECT, DISPROPORTIONATE 
MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2014), https://www. 
sentencingproject.org/publications/disproportionate-minority-contact-in-the-juvenile-
justice-system [https://perma.cc/CZ5L-8A5B]; MELISSA SICKMUND & CHARLES 
PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2014 
NATIONAL REPORT 157–59, 214 (2014), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ 
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counsel should not be appointed for juveniles facing delinquency 
charges. On the contrary, these studies suggest that juvenile defenders 
must be better funded, better trained, better resourced, more 
experienced, and appointed not in just the most serious cases. 
C.   Rights, Politics, and Compensatory Punishment 
If it is true that the Warren Court omitted race and opted for a 
comparatively weak constitutional framework in Gault, in an effort to 
avoid political fallout, its strategy did not work. A punitive backlash 
was already percolating. 
The political rhetoric of “law and order” first emerged in the late 
1950s. Angered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education, southern politicians called for a crackdown on the 
“‘hoodlums’ and ‘agitators’ . . . who challenged segregation and 
African American disenfranchisement.”259 A decade later, Barry 
Goldwater’s “crime in the streets” condemnation of American society 
brought criminal justice into the national political discourse. “History 
shows us . . . that . . . nothing prepares the way for tyranny . . . more 
than the failure of public offices to keep the streets safe from bullies 
and marauders,” Goldwater warned during his acceptance speech at 
the 1964 Republican convention.260 Goldwater’s message resonated. 
By 1968, 80% of the public agreed that crime was increasing, “law 
and order had broken down” in the United States, and that “Negroes 
who start riots” were the source of the problem.261 Being “tough on 
crime” provided a political opportunity to use race as a wedge issue 
for electoral advantage.262 
Over the next three decades, lawmakers enacted a series of 
increasingly harsh tough-on-crime measures. In 1968, for example, in 
 
nr2014/downloads/NR2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BU5-4AU8] (noting that more 
than half of juveniles in detention did not have a lawyer). 
 259. Katherine Beckett & Theodore Sasson, The Origins of the Current Conservative 
Discourse on Law and Order, in CONSERVATIVE AGENDAS AND CAMPAIGNS: THE RISE OF THE 
MODERN “TOUGH ON CRIME” MOVEMENT 44, 44 (2005), http://www.publiceye.org/ 
defendingjustice/pdfs/chapters/toughcrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QDN-6YWT]. 
 260. Barry Goldwater, Acceptance Address at the 1964 Republican National 
Convention (July 16, 1964) (transcript available at http://www.4president.org/ 
speeches/1964/barrygoldwater1964acceptance.htm [https://perma.cc/2DXX-FRBY]). 
 261. BECKETT, supra note 63, at 38. 
 262. See Beckett & Sasson, supra note 259, at 43–44; see, e.g., Cornell W. Clayton & 
J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the 
Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1396 tbl.1 (2006) 
(noting that the 1968 election saw both parties devote higher percentages of their 
political platforms to criminal justice than in previous presidential elections). 
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an attempt to assure the public that he was tough on crime, President 
Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968,263 which increased funding for law enforcement and provided 
for expanded use of wiretaps and Miranda-less confessions.264 The 
Omnibus Bill’s eventual successor, the now infamous Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,265 authorized more than 
$30 billion for crime-prevention efforts, law enforcement, and state 
prison construction.266 In parallel, individual states enacted measures 
like California’s three-strikes law,267 which mandates twenty-five years 
to life sentences following conviction for any third felony, and New 
Jersey’s Megan’s Law,268 which requires sex offender registration and 
public notification.269 Multiple states also adopted truth-in-sentencing 
laws, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, and zero-tolerance 
practices, which resulted in harsher penalties and the virtual 
elimination of rehabilitation programs.270 
Comparable laws and policies were enacted in the juvenile justice 
system during what would come to be known as the “get tough” era.271 
As juvenile crime rates climbed between the mid-1980s and 1990s,272 
calls for stiffer penalties for adolescent lawbreakers became louder. 
 
 263. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). 
 264. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 §§ 201-406 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006)). 
 265. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
 266. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §§ 20109, 30104, 
30202, 30403, 30702, 30802, 31132, 31707, 31904, 40414, 40422, 40603, 90206, 
200112, 200210, 210306, 250005, 270009, 310003, 310004 (cataloguing various 
appropriations provisions within the Act) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13071–14223). 
 267. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1), (e)(2)(A) (West 2019) (providing for a five-
year enhancement for each prior felony and an indeterminate life sentence of at 
least twenty-five years for a third felony). 
 268. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-12, 7-13(a)–(b) to -19 (West 2019). 
 269. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-12, 7-13(a)–(b). Congress enacted a federal version of 
Megan’s Law in 1996, which requires states to form registries of offenders convicted 
of either sexually violent offenses or offenses against children. See Jacob Wetterling 
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub L. No. 
103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994), amended by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901, 
16902, 16912, 16913 (2012)) (maintaining earlier version). 
 270. MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 124 (2011). 
 271. See Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black 
Males in America, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 281, 299–300 (2012). 
 272. See FELD, supra note 18, at 201 (“[T]he juvenile arrest rate for all violent 
crimes increased 67.3% . . . between 1986 and 1995.”). 
2020] RACE, RIGHTS, & REPRESENTATION 785 
Conservative politicians branded them “super-predators.”273 If 
lawmakers did not do more to incapacitate them, then, as former 
Princeton Professor John DiIulio predicted in 1996, there would be 
270,000 more super-predators on the streets by 2010.274 “Unless we 
act today, we’re going to have a bloodbath when these kids grow up,” 
criminologist James Fox warned.275 
Lawmakers responded. Between 1992 and 1997 alone, legislatures 
in forty-five states enacted or enhanced statutes that made it easier to 
punish children like adults.276 Thirty-one states gave both juvenile and 
criminal courts expanded sentencing authority over juveniles, forty-
seven states enacted laws that modified or removed traditional 
juvenile court confidentiality provisions by making records and 
proceedings more open, and twenty-two states expanded the role of 
juvenile crime victims in the juvenile justice process.277 Laws like 
California’s Proposition 21,278 which required adult trials for juveniles 
as young as fourteen, transferred discretion from judges to 
prosecutors, weakened confidentiality laws, toughened gang laws, and 
expanded California’s three-strikes law for both juveniles and adults, 
became the norm.279 
The net effect of these laws was extraordinary. Between 1985 and 
1994, the number of delinquency cases judicially waived to criminal 
 
 273. DiIulio, supra note 35, at 25–26; see also John DiIulio, Defining Criminality Up, 
WALL STREET J., July 3, 1996, at A10; Suzanne Fields, The Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, 
Oct. 17, 1996, at A23 (“The super-predator is upon us”); Gene Koprowski, The Rise of 
the Teen Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A17. See generally Perry L. 
Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 
864–68 (2010) (discussing the “super-predator” era of juvenile justice). 
 274. The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 7, 2014), 
https://eji.org/news/superpredator-myth-20-years-later [https://perma.cc/H4QX-
TAA7]; see also WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW 
TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 26 (1996) (charting the projected 
increase in the United States juvenile population between 1990 and 2010). 
 275. Laurie Garrett, Murders by Teens Soaring, NEWSDAY, Feb. 18, 1995, at A11. 
 276. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 96 (2006), 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VJ4-RCQK]; PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO 
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 3–4 (1996). 
 277. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 276, at 96–97. 
 278. Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, § (2), Ballot 
Measure 4, 1999–2000 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§ 707(d) (West 2019)). 
 279. See Proposition 21, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/ 
2000/21_03_2000.html [https://perma.cc/P9HM-4KYL]. 
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court climbed to 83%, from 7200 to 13,200.280 In 1988, approximately 
1600 juveniles were confined in adult jails; by 1997, there were more 
than 9000.281 More than 2000 of these youth were serving sentences 
of life without the possibility of parole282—a punishment to which no 
other country in the Western world subscribed. 
D.   Racialized Juvenile Justice 
All of these post-Gault dynamics, such as the criminalization of the 
juvenile court, lack of access to well-trained, well-funded counsel, and 
the extraordinary punitiveness of the “get tough” era, had the 
harshest impact on youth of color. While social scientists had known 
for decades that adolescents of color, and Black youth in particular, 
were more likely than their white counterparts to be arrested, 
detained, formally charged in juvenile court, transferred to adult 
court, and confined to secure residential facilities,283 these disparities 
grew exponentially during the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1983 and 1997, 
four out of five youth newly held in detention were children of color,284 
and the disparities in the transfer of juveniles of color were even greater. 
A 2000 study, for example, showed that 82% of youth charged in adult 
court in eighteen of the largest jurisdictions in the country were youth of 
 
 280. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 276, at 186. The combined effects of judicial 
waiver, prosecutorial direct file, offense exclusion, and age of majority laws result in 
more than 200,000 chronological juveniles tried in criminal courts annually. Barry C. 
Feld & Donna M. Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 801, 815. 
 281. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS 
AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 5, tbl.2 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6E5-RRBN]. 
 282. State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), 
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 2, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/state-
distribution-youth-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole-jlwop 
[https://perma.cc/C75M-EJNQ]. 
 283. Indeed, the problem of racial disparities in the juvenile justice system is so 
long-standing, wide-spread, and entrenched that it has earned its own acronym—
Disproportionate Minority Contact or “DMC.” POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 39, 
at 5–6 (explaining the meaning of disproportionate minority contact); see also CARL 
E. POPE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: A 
REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE FROM 1989 THROUGH 2001 10 n.1 (2002) 
(describing “race effects” within the juvenile justice system and suggesting these 
effects impact minority juveniles); Michael J. Leiber, Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement (DMC) of Youth: An Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to Address the Issue, 48 
CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 4–5 (2002) (describing how states enact methods to address the 
effects of disproportionate minority confinement). 
 284. HINTON HOYTT ET AL., supra note 38, at 10 (documenting the significant increases 
in racial disproportionality in juvenile detention facilities during the 1990s). 
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color. Moreover, Black and Latino youth were much more likely than 
white youth to receive a sentence of incarceration.285 
Racial disparities remain extreme today. In 2014, white youth 
comprised 70% of those ages ten to seventeen in the United States, 
but only 35% of arrested youth, 41% of adjudicated youth, and 33% 
of youth waived into the adult system.286 Conversely, Black youth 
comprised just 16% of those ages ten to seventeen nationally, but 
were 42% of arrested youth, 37% of adjudicated youth, and 53% of 
youth waived into the adult system.287 Youth of color currently 
comprise approximately 45% of the general youth population, but 
they are almost 70% of the youth being held in residential facilities by 
juvenile courts.288 When youth of color violate a technical condition 
of probation—failure to meet with a probation officer or pay 
restitution—they are significantly more likely to be committed to an 
out-of-home placement than are white youths.289 
Critically, studies have repeatedly shown that any statistical 
differences in offending patterns are simply not great enough to 
account for the racial disparities observed at any of the processing 
points in the U.S. juvenile justice system.290 Instead, research suggests 
that the primary sources of these disparities are the over-
criminalization, over-policing, and over-punishment of juveniles of 
color, and the implicit racial biases that drive decision makers to 
rationalize their disparate treatment.291 
 
 285. JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 38, at 3, 5, 9 (providing a study of more than 2500 
cases filed in eighteen of the largest jurisdictions in the country demonstrated that 
African-American youth were disproportionately charged in adult court and were 
more likely than white or Latino youth to receive a sentence of incarceration). 
 286. Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2017, NAT’L CTR. JUV. JUST., 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/asp/selection.asp [https://perma.cc/4GD9-S7Q3] 
(last updated Apr. 23, 2019); Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990–2018, supra note 40. 
 287.  See Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2017, supra note 286; Easy Access 
to Juvenile Populations: 1990–2018, supra note 40. 
 288. Easy Access to the Census Data of Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997–2017, 
NAT’L CTR. JUV. JUST., https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/display.asp 
[https://perma.cc/U8KV-YPQ4] (last updated Apr. 23, 2019). 
 289. BURNS INST., STEMMING THE RISING TIDE: RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN YOUTH 
INCARCERATION & STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 10 (2016), https://www.burnsinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Stemming-the-Rising-Tide_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77GK-Y2JB]. 
 290. See HINTON HOYTT ET AL., supra note 284, at 20–22 (explaining that white youths 
admit to various offenses at higher rates than Black youths, but that Black youths are 
arrested at significantly higher rates than white youths for these same offenses). 
 291. While research suggests that Black youth commit “slightly more violent 
crime” than white youth, they commit “about the same amount of property crime, 
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Research has consistently shown that racial disparities in juvenile 
processing are most pronounced at the point of arrest. Black youth 
are twice as likely as white youth to be arrested for the same 
conduct,292 and these disparities have remained even as overall levels 
of arrests have decreased.293 Research also finds that law enforcement 
tend to arrest youth of color for all levels of offenses, but, on average, 
arrest white youth only for medium- or high-level offenses.294 In other 
words, youth of color are more likely to be arrested for low-level, non-
violent behavior than their white counterparts. More troubling still, 
these front-end disparities grow into larger disparities as youth move 
through juvenile and criminal legal processing,295 which 
disproportionately subjects youth of color to the well-documented 
harms of detention and secure confinement.296 
When it comes to disposition, studies show that Black youth are 4.1 
times as likely to be committed to secure placements as white youth, 
Indigenous youth are 3.1 times as likely, and Latino/Hispanic youth 
 
and less drug crime than white youth,” and “[i]n no category can the marginal 
differences in white and African-American behavior explain the huge disparity in 
arrest or incarceration rates.” Id. at 19. Black youth are arrested at twice the rate of 
white youth for drug offenses and 2.5 times the rate of white youth for weapons 
offenses, even though white youth report substantially higher levels of drug use and 
commission of weapons crimes. Id. at 20–21; see also FELD, supra note 21, at 138 
(noting that a “consistent finding of delinquency sentencing research is that after 
statistical controls for legal variables, juveniles’ race affects dispositions”). 
 292. Michael Leiber & Nancy Rodriguez, The Implementation of the Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement/Contact (DMC) Mandate: A Failure or Success?, 1 RACE & JUST. 103, 105 (2011). 
 293. Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990–2018, supra note 286; Statistical Briefing 
Book: Law Enforcement & Juvenile Crime, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Jan. 1, 
2019), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr_trend.asp?table_in=2 [https:// 
perma.cc/7T6E-C2YR]. 
 294. Arrests, CHI. YOUTH JUST. DATA PROJECT (2010), http://www. 
chicagoyouthjustice.com/Project_NIA_Arrests_page_v2.html [https://perma.cc/US2H-
HQEC]; see also JOSHUA ROVNER, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN YOUTH 
COMMITMENTS AND ARRESTS (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/04/Racial-Disparities-in-Youth-Commitments-and-Arrests.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9KAA-969B]. 
 295. See John Wooldredge et al., Is the Impact of Cumulative Disadvantage on 
Sentencing Greater for Black Defendants?, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 187, 189 (2015) 
(recognizing that “less desirable outcomes at later decision points” may be 
attributable to “less desirable dispositions at earlier decision points”). 
 296. These can include high levels of violence, including the use of excessive force 
and restraints by staff, sexual assault, and isolation. RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY 
FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 5 (2011), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED527944.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PQG-4V3H]. 
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are 1.5 times as likely.297 Even as levels of youth confinement have 
declined overall, the racial gap between Black and Indigenous youth 
versus white youth has increased.298 
To date, hundreds of multiple regression studies have been 
conducted on disparities in the juvenile court, and nearly two-thirds 
have documented a statistically significant “race effect” on decision 
making, which suggests that race-neutral criteria cannot, by 
themselves, account for these disparate outcomes.299 In other words, 
but for the presence of racial bias, juveniles of color would not be 
overrepresented to the degree that they are. 
Multiple studies have detected the presence of racial bias in 
decision making among justice system stakeholders, including police 
officers,300 judges,301 probation officers,302 and defense attorneys.303 A 
 
 297. Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997–2017, NAT’L 
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 298. ROVNER, supra note 294, at 1. 
 299. See, e.g., CARL E. POPE & WILLIAM FEYERHERM, MINORITIES AND THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: RESEARCH SUMMARY 2, 13–14 (1995) (confirming the 
overrepresentation of minorities in the juvenile justice system); Bishop, supra note 
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assessment of the causes of DMC”); see also Carl E. Pope & Michael J. Leiber, 
Disproportionate Minority Confinement/Contact (DMC): The Federal Initiative, in OUR 
CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN 
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 351, 352 (providing “a historical overview of the activities 
employed to address disproportionate minority youth confinement/contact”). 
 300. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial 
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1009–13, 1015–17 
(2007) (finding that police officers were more likely to shoot a Black person than a 
white person in a video-game simulation in which they were instructed to shoot if the 
person was armed); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial 
Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 499 (2004) 
(documenting the impact of written racial cues on police and probation officers’ 
judgments about the “culpability, likely recidivism, and deserved punishment” of 
hypothetical offenders). 
 301. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 
784 (2001) (reporting on a study of 167 federal magistrate judges, which revealed 
that they are susceptible to “heuristics” and biases when making decisions); Michael 
J. Leiber & Kristan C. Fox, Race and the Impact of Detention on Juvenile Justice Decision 
Making, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 470, 489–90 (2005) (attributing observed negative race 
790 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:743 
study of juvenile probation officers conducted more than twenty years 
ago continues to be illuminating. In 1998, in an attempt to determine 
why Black youth in three Washington State counties were receiving 
harsher sentencing recommendations than white youth charged with 
the same crimes, sociologists George Bridges and Sara Steen examined 
more than 200 county probation reports.304 After controlling for factors 
such as age, gender, and offense history, Bridges and Steen found that 
the officers were more likely to attribute the criminal behavior of Black 
youth to “internal attributions,” such as personal failure, inadequate 
moral character, and personality, but saw the criminal behavior of 
white youth as a product of “external attributions,” such as poor 
home life, lack of appropriate role models, and environment.305 
These perceptions, in turn, led the officers to recommend state 
intervention for minority youth at greater rates.306 This and other 
similar studies demonstrate the nefarious role that racial bias can play 
in juvenile court outcomes for children of color. 
Finally, there is a limited body of research examining the 
relationship between race and representation and lawyers’ impact on 
juveniles’ dispositions.307 One study reported that prosecutors charged 
 
effects in outcomes to “racial stereotyping of African Americans as delinquent, prone 
to drug offenses, dangerous, and unsuitable for treatment”). 
 302. See, e.g., Bridges & Steen, supra note 44, at 567 (concluding that probation 
officers’ written rationales for sentencing recommendations indicated that they were 
more likely to attribute the criminal behavior of minority youth to internal forces, 
such as personal failure, inadequate moral character, and personality, and the 
criminal behavior of white youth to external forces, such as environment, even when 
the objective risk factors associated with the youth were similar). 
 303. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death 
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2004) (finding that capital defense 
attorneys exhibit the same levels of implicit bias as the rest of the population). 
 304. Bridges & Steen, supra note 44, at 557–58; see also Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The 
Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 529–35 (2014) (explaining the findings of a study that suggested 
that individuals perceive Black youths to be less innocent than white youths after 
turning ten years old). 
 305. Bridges & Steen, supra note 44, at 561, 564, 566–67 (emphasis omitted). 
 306. Bridges & Steen, supra note 44, at 564–67. 
 307. See, e.g., Gaylene S. Armstrong & Bitna Kim, Juvenile Penalties for “Lawyering 
Up”: The Role of Counsel and Extralegal Case Characteristics, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 827, 832 
(2011) (noting few studies address the impact of counsel on juvenile minorities); 
Barry C. Feld, The Social Context of Juvenile Justice Administration: Racial Disparities in an 
Urban Juvenile Court, in MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 66 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard 
et al., eds., 1995) (describing racial disparities in sentencing across studies); Lori 
Guevara et al., Race, Gender, and Legal Counsel: Differential Outcomes in Two Juvenile 
Courts, 6 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 83, 83–84, 97, 99 (2008) (describing the 
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Black youths with more serious crimes than white youths, which increased 
their likelihood of representation.308 Higher rates of representation and 
a youth’s minority status may expose her to higher rates of more severe 
dispositions.309 Yet, again, these findings may be as easily attributed to 
disparities in charging and a lack of training, funding, experience and 
resources for lawyers who represent juveniles of color. The stark reality 
remains that while youth of color are no longer subjected to Jim Crow 
juvenile justice as it was administered in the first half of the twentieth 
century, compared with white youths, they have fared worse in every 
other way during the post-Gault era. 
III.    RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPRESENTATION IN THE JUVENILE COURT 
Much of the scholarship generated in connection with Gault’s 50th 
Anniversary has explored ways to buttress the right to counsel in juvenile 
court.310 We agree that, within the juvenile court’s current framework, 
many of these proposed procedural reforms are important. Yet, as 
described in Section II.D, the primary sources of racial injustice in the 
juvenile court are not a lack of procedural safeguards, but the over-
criminalization, over-policing, and over-punishment of juveniles of color, 
and the narratives and implicit racial biases that allow decision makers 
continually to rationalize these choices.311 Even the best lawyers and most 
robust procedures will not cure these substantive inequities. Evidence 
suggests that they will be most effectively addressed not through additional 
procedure, but through substantive reforms that target their sources. 
 
impact of race and counsel on outcomes); Lori Guevara et al., Race, Legal 
Representation, and Juvenile Justice: Issues and Concerns, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 344–45, 
367 (2004) (discussing research on the impact of counsel on juvenile outcomes); 
Jennifer H. Peck & Maude Beaudry-Cyr, Does Who Appears Before the Juvenile Court 
Matter on Adjudication and Disposition Outcomes? The Interaction Between Client Race and 
Lawyer Type, 39 J. CRIME & JUSTICE 131, 131–32 (2016) (reporting the impact of 
counsel on juvenile outcomes is rarely considered or explained adequately). 
 308. See Feld, supra note 307, at 78 (reporting that Black youth are charged with 
more serious crimes and are more likely to be represented). 
 309. See id. at 92–93 (finding the presence of counsel may aggravate outcomes for 
a charged juvenile). 
 310. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 311. Within the criminal context, Paul Butler and others have linked the over-
incarceration of “poor people” and people of color to over-policing, the failure of 
lawmakers to account for conditions that “breed some forms of law-breaking,” 
“explicit and implicit bias by key actors in the criminal justice system, including 
police, prosecutors, and judges,” the “crime control system of criminal justice, in 
which guilt is presumed,” and, cumulatively, the creation of a “criminal caste.” Paul 
D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2183–
85 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
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A.   Buttressing Gault 
A number of recent reports and articles have lamented Gault’s 
unrealized promises and have detailed how,312 why313 and the extent 
to which314 juveniles are denied access to counsel in the juvenile 
court. Several of these commentators have also proposed responses. 
We endorse several of these. 
First and foremost, state legislatures must appropriate the funds 
necessary for a fully functioning juvenile defense bar.315 For decades, 
the legislative inclination to be “tough on crime” and avoid the 
appearance of “coddling criminals” has contributed to underfunded 
public defender systems, which in many instances provide the 
appearance but not the reality of effective assistance of counsel. As 
criminologist Kimberly Kempf-Leonard has observed: 
[T]he real difficulty is not who should assist youths in delinquency 
proceedings. The problem for any advocate is how to be effective 
in a system that does not have much political clout, operates via 
informal directives and procedures, and is administered by officials 
who rarely are held accountable.316 
Second, developmental psychologists have argued for decades that 
most juveniles lack competence to exercise or waive legal rights.317 
 
 312. Several commentators have argued that counsel is appointed both too late, 
see, e.g., Laura Cohen & Sandra Simkins, No More “Desert Devil’s Island”: The Right to 
Counsel for Incarcerated Children, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 227, 
227, 231–32, 245 (arguing that Gault should extend to post-conviction proceedings); 
Casey McGowan et al., Moving Forward from Gault, CHAMPION, Apr. 2017, at 22, 22, 24, 
26 (arguing that Gault should extend to pre-trial proceedings), and removed too 
early in the juvenile court process, see, e.g., Sandra Simkins & Laura Cohen, The 
Critical Role of Post-Disposition Representation in Addressing the Needs of Incarcerated Youth, 
8 J. MARSHALL L.J. 312, 315 (2015) (arguing that “post-dispositional” legal 
representation for youth in extended custody is a constitutional requirement). 
 313. See, e.g., JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUVENILE LAW CTR., THE PRICE OF JUSTICE: THE 
HIGH COST OF “FREE” COUNSEL FOR YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 5–6, 14 
(2018), https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2018-07/Paying-For-Justice-
2018FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ5T-PHGP] (presenting evidence that 
stringent financial eligibility requirements and hidden fees undermine juveniles’ 
access to counsel in jurisdictions across the country). 
 314. See generally NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., supra note 15 (describing obstacles to a 
juvenile’s ability to get representation). 
 315. See Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 368–70 (implying the legislature 
needs to allot funds for public defense attorneys). 
 316. Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Does Having an Attorney Provide a Better Outcome?: The Right 
to Counsel Does Not Mean Attorney Help Youths 9 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 361–62 (2010). 
 317. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical 
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1166 (1980) (asserting the juvenile comprehension 
of Miranda rights is deficient). 
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Differences in age and competence would suggest that youths should 
receive more, rather than fewer, procedural safeguards than adults to 
protect them from punitive delinquency adjudications and their own 
improvident decisions and developmental limitations. Legislatures 
should recognize the developmental limitations of juveniles and 
mandate consultation with counsel before waiver or stand-by counsel 
for all juveniles charged with felonies, serious misdemeanors, or 
juveniles who face out-of-home placement.318 While this would 
impose substantial costs and burdens on legal services delivery in 
many states, it is consistent with Gault’s promise. 
Third, lawyers who represent juveniles must be well-trained and 
skilled in juvenile law and practice. Law schools typically offer only a 
single elective substantive course or clinic on juvenile justice, and these 
often focus on family, adoption, or dependency procedures.319 Most 
juvenile defenders receive little training “in adolescent development or 
the range and relative effectiveness of various juvenile dispositions and 
treatments.”320 The training of juvenile defenders, both during and 
after law school, must be enhanced. 
Fourth, eligibility for public defender services must be based on a 
child’s resources rather than on parents’ income or their willingness 
to hire a lawyer.321 Fees and court costs must also be eliminated.322 
California did this in 2017. California Senate Bill 190 eliminates 
public defender fees and administrative costs previously charged for 
juvenile detention, probation supervision, electronic monitoring, and 
drug testing.323 It also provides that parents must receive notice that 
they “shall not be liable for the cost of counsel or legal assistance 
furnished by the court for purposes of representing the minor.”324 
Other states should follow suit. 
Fifth, because of the rapidity of delinquency case-processing, 
appointment of counsel should occur at the initial arraignment or 
detention hearing, if not before, to allow sufficient time for investigation 
 
 318. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (prohibiting incarceration 
without representation); FELD, supra note 148, at 248–49 (recommending a 
prohibition against incarceration or removal from home without counsel). 
 319. Kempf-Leonard, supra note 316, at 360. 
 320. Id. at 360. 
 321. Cf. FELD, supra note 148, at 103–06 (discussing public defenders’ 
representation of juveniles). 
 322. Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 369 (asserting the “appointment of counsel 
should not depend on the income of the parents or their willingness to hire a lawyer”). 
 323. S.B. 190, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (signed into law on October 11, 2017). 
 324. Id. § 12. 
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and case preparation. Youth should also be guaranteed postdispositional 
legal representation. Not only is there a strong argument that it is 
constitutionally guaranteed,325 but it is also one of the only ways to 
subject juvenile facilities to consistent observation and scrutiny. 
Sixth, advocates have long claimed that “opening juvenile court to 
public scrutiny . . . . increases the chances that courts will appoint 
lawyers and that lawyers will do their jobs.”326 While we do not advocate 
opening the doors to media and the general public, expanding 
appellate review provides one of the most important means of increasing 
the transparency and accountability of delinquency proceedings and 
ensuring that juveniles’ right to counsel is respected.327 
Finally, a state supreme court or other criminal justice agency 
should require data on appointment of counsel to be collected in 
real time with administrative oversight to immediately flag and rectify 
cases in which youths appeared without counsel.328 Data collection 
must include both a youth’s race and representation status. 
B.   A Critique of Procedural Rights 
A number of scholars have focused on what they see as the inherent 
limitations and unintended consequences of an overreliance on 
procedural rights. According to William Stuntz, it is nearly impossible 
to improve the justice system through criminal procedure reforms 
alone because the legislative and executive branches of government 
have myriad ways to compensate for and evade compliance with the 
Court’s mandates.329 
 
 325. Simkins & Cohen, supra note 312, at 342 (“[A]lthough Gault addressed only 
‘proceedings to determine delinquency,’ . . . subsequent federal appellate court 
decisions have assumed that the more expansive guarantee of the Sixth Amendment 
applies with full force to youth charged with delinquency.” (footnote omitted)). 
 326. Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 370. 
 327. See Harris, supra note 205, at 228–29 (asserting accountability in juvenile courts is 
improved with appellate review); Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 370 (asserting 
appellate review is a method of accountability present when juveniles have counsel). 
 328. Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 371. 
 329. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 561–62 (1992) (“[O]vercriminalization is an easy 
way to get around Fourth Amendment restrictions.”); Stuntz, supra note 171, at 70–
71, 76 (asserting countermajoritarian criminal procedure can lead to overbroad 
criminal statutes and underfunded defense counsel); see also Richard A. Posner, The 
Most Punitive Nation, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Sept. 1, 1995, at 3, 4 (arguing that 
legislatures have responded to increased constitutional rights for criminals by 
making punishments more severe). 
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In a legislatively funded system with state-paid prosecutors and defense 
attorneys, judge-made procedural rights are bound to have some perverse 
effects, pushing prosecutors and defense attorneys and legislators and 
even the judges themselves in uncomfortable directions.330 
Other commentators have argued that an overreliance on 
procedural rights can also serve to legitimate institutions that might 
otherwise become unstable by creating the illusion that the problem is 
fixed331 or risk of “entrenching” and “legitimating” the infirmities in 
question.332 Carol and Jordan Steiker have argued, for example, that 
the Court’s imposition of procedural constraints on capital 
punishment instilled a false sense of “faith among justice system 
participants and the general public in the reliability and fairness of 
the process” and had the unintended effect of further entrenching 
the punishment itself.333 
Paul Butler and Gabriel Chin have extended these procedural 
rights critiques to Gideon. Gideon “demonstrates the critique of rights” 
by “divert[ing] attention from economic and racial critiques of the 
criminal justice system” and “provid[ing] legitimation of the status 
quo,” Butler writes.334 Chin argues that Gideon “has not been and 
likely cannot be a remedy for systematic racial disproportionality in 
the criminal justice system” because, despite the Warren Court’s 
concern about institutional racism, Gideon was not designed to 
address it.335 Paradoxically, he claims, Gideon and its progeny may 
have made racial disproportionality worse by improving outcomes for 
white defendants.336 “At the same time,” Chin notes, Gideon “formally 
and perhaps more broadly legitimates these racially disparate results 
because convictions obtained against defendants who had counsel are 
presumptively valid.”337 
 
 330. Stuntz, supra note 171, at 5. 
 331. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 719, 
721, 746 (1992) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education and Miranda v. Arizona “traded 
the promise of substantial reform implicit in prior doctrine for a political symbol”). 
 332. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform from the American 
Experiment with Capital Punishment, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 748–49 (2014) (defining 
entrench as incremental reform that diminishes the need for larger reform and 
defining legitimate as incremental reform that creates an illusion of reliability). 
 333. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4, 155–56 (2016). 
 334. Butler, supra note 311, at 2178, 2196–97. 
 335. Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236, 
2238–39 (2013). 
 336. Id. at 2238, 2254–55. 
 337. Id. at 2258. 
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The same can be said about Gault. Despite its well-documented 
concern about racial inequality, the Warren Court chose a case 
involving a white juvenile as the vehicle to address fairness and 
inequality in the juvenile court. And in doing so, it relied exclusively 
on a series of race-neutral procedural rules. As critical as the rights to 
counsel, notice, and confrontation may be to the accuracy and 
regularity of juvenile court proceedings, they are unlikely to alleviate 
the profound racial inequities that were pervasive in the juvenile 
court at the time of Gault and which remain so today. Indeed, these 
inequities have only increased since Gault was decided, not least 
because the legislative and executive branches of government have 
compensated for and evaded compliance with Gault’s mandates.338 By 
creating the illusion that the juvenile court had somehow been fixed, 
Gault may also have removed the impetus for substantive reforms that 
may benefit juveniles of color. We discuss some of these below. 
C.   Toward Substantive Reform 
Even if Gault’s protections were fully buttressed, however, its 
procedural mandates would not fundamentally alter the primary 
sources of systemic disproportionality in the juvenile court. Instead, 
we argue, the substantive problem of racial disproportionality in the 
juvenile court requires substantive policy reforms. We identify three. 
This analysis is timely. In the wake of a series of recent Supreme 
Court decisions recognizing that children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of punishment, legislatures and 
courts across the country are engaged in juvenile court reform.339 
Gault’s racial legacy should be instructive. As important as procedural 
rights may be to institutional fairness and accuracy, we contend that 
substantive policy reform should be the priority. 
1. Decriminalizing non-violent youthful behavior 
Since Gault was decided, nearly every state has dramatically 
expanded its criminal code.340 When it comes to youth, the impact of 
 
 338. See Stuntz, supra note 329, at 561–62 (“[O]vercriminalization is an easy way to 
get around Fourth Amendment restrictions.”); Stuntz, supra note 171, at 54, 70–71, 
76; see also Posner, supra note 329, at 4 (arguing that legislatures have responded to 
increased constitutional rights for criminals by making punishments more severe). 
 339. See generally Perry L. Moriearty, The Trilogy and Beyond, 62 S.D. L. REV. 539 
(2017) (examining state legislatures’ reactions to the Court’s decisions in Roper v. 
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama). 
 340. See generally Andrea L. Dennis, Decriminalizing Childhood, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 
5, 8–9 (2017) (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151); Roger A. Fairfax, 
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this “over-criminalization” trend has been compounded by the 
concomitant criminalization of behavior that is non-criminal for 
adults, such as truancy, curfew violations, alcohol consumption, and 
consensual sexual activity.341 The statistics are alarming: of the nearly 
55,000 youth confined in juvenile facilities on a given day in 2013, 
5000 were placed out of home for a technical violation, such as 
failure to appear for a probation meeting or drug test.342 More 
troubling still, 67% were youth of color.343 Black and Native American 
youth were almost four times as likely as white youth to be placed out 
of home on this basis.344 
Legislatively converting most criminal misdemeanors to civil 
infractions and/or reducing criminal penalties to noncustodial 
intervention for nonviolent, youthful conduct and status offenses 
would have an immediate impact on these racial inequities. Over the 
last several years, lawmakers in Texas, Ohio, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Idaho, and California have taken steps to decriminalize status 
offenses such as truancy, alcohol possession, and transit fare evasion 
to great effect.345 These efforts should be expanded. 
2. Expanding diversion 
Beyond the wholesale reorientation of local law enforcement 
policies, an obvious response to the over-policing of juveniles of color 
is increased reliance on diversion—both informal, pre-charge 
diversion without mandated requirements for low-level behavior and 
formal diversion with community-based programming and services 
for more serious conduct.346 Diversion programs exist in jurisdictions 
 
Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy 
and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597 (2011) (“emphasiz[ing] fairness and accuracy in 
the administration of criminal justice”); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New 
Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529 (2012) (introducing 
the fight against overcriminalization after 1966). 
 341. Dennis, supra note 340, at 8–9. 
 342. BURNS INST., supra note 289, at 10, 17. 
 343. Id. at 10. 
 344. Id. at 4. 
 345. Dennis, supra note 340, at 30–31, 33; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor 
Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1067–69 (2015) (asserting decriminalization 
can be enacted by legislature, courts, or law enforcement). 
 346. See Stephanie Béchard et al., Arbitrary Arbitration: Diverting Juveniles into the 
Justice System—A Reexamination after 22 Years, 55 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. 
CRIM. 605, 606, 621–22 (2011). 
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throughout the country.347 While critical questions remain about how 
to determine which youth should be diverted and the risk of “net 
widening,” there is evidence that increased reliance on diversion 
could substantially benefit youth of color.348 
3. Constraining juvenile punishment 
In a trilogy of cases beginning in 2005, the Court issued three 
decisions imposing substantive constraints on the harshest forms of 
juvenile punishment: banning the execution of individuals under 
eighteen in Roper v. Simmons,349 banning life sentences without the 
possibility of parole for juveniles who had not committed homicide in 
Graham v. Florida,350 and banning life without parole for all juveniles 
when imposed mandatorily in Miller v. Alabama.351 In each case, the 
Court applied the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment to juveniles, emphasizing their reduced culpability 
and impaired competence to exercise procedural rights.352 
All three decisions emphasized that juveniles’ immature judgment 
and limited self-control causes them to act impulsively and without 
adequate appreciation of consequences;353 their susceptibility to negative 
peers and inability to escape criminogenic environments reduce their 
responsibility;354 and their transitory personality provides less reliable 
 
 347. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 
FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 241 (2015) (recommending diversion programs to reduce 
racial disparity in incarceration). 
 348. See Traci Schlesinger, Decriminalizing Racialized Youth through Juvenile Diversion, 
28 FUTURE CHILD. 59, 60, 66, 68–70 (2018) (asserting youth of color are excluded 
from diversion programs). 
 349. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 350. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 351. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 352. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and 
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 L. & INEQ. 
263, 263–64 (2013) (explaining these cases’ impact on juvenile criminal law); Barry 
C. Feld, Competence and Culpability: Delinquents in Juvenile Court, Youths in Criminal 
Court, 102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 549–69 (2017); Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old 
Enough To Do the Crime, Too Young To Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107 (2013) 
(tracing the effects of these three cases). 
 353. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable 
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions 
and decisions.” (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))). 
 354. Id. at 569 (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” (citing Eddings v 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982))). The Court explained: “Their own 
vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings 
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evidence of enduring blameworthiness.355 The Court in Graham also 
noted that developmental characteristics impaired juveniles’ defenses 
and increased the likelihood of improvident waivers of counsel:356 
[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them 
at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles 
mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal 
justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it. 
They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers 
to aid in their defense. Difficulty in weighing long-term 
consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to 
trust defense counsel, seen as part of the adult world a rebellious 
youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with a 
juvenile offense. These factors are likely to impair the quality of a 
juvenile defendant’s representation.357 
The reaction to this trilogy of cases was akin to the reaction to 
Gault. Scholars believed that not only might this jurisprudence 
impact other juvenile processing358 and sentencing decisions359 and 
extend to other vulnerable populations;360 it had the potential to 
transform the regulation of sentencing in the United States.361 
 
mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape 
negative influences in their whole environment.” Id. at 570. 
 355. Id. at 570 (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an 
adult.”). Because juveniles’ character is transitional, “[f]rom a moral standpoint it 
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a 
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Id. 
 356. The Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida emphasized juveniles’ inability to 
work with counsel. “[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put 
them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles mistrust adults 
and have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the 
institutional actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work effectively with 
their lawyers to aid in their defense.” 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010). 
 357. Id. at 78 (citations omitted). 
 358. See generally Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile 
Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010) (suggesting that lawyers use Graham to ensure 
that all children under eighteen are given a change to atone for their crimes as well 
as establish a constitutional right to rehabilitation). 
 359. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Breen & John R. Mills, Mandating Discretion: Juvenile 
Sentencing Schemes After Miller v. Alabama, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 307–09 (2015) 
(describing reasons for the individualized sentencing of juveniles). 
 360. See, e.g., Helen Shin, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near?: The Impact of Atkins 
and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
465, 477–78, 480–81 (2007) (discussing how excessive punishments are judged by 
currently prevailing standards and how defendants with diminished capacity are not likely 
to be deterred); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: 
Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 819–20 (2009) (analyzing how 
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Though a number of commentators have lamented the slow, 
uneven and, in some cases, non-existent implementation of these 
decisions,362 it is indisputable that they have had a meaningful impact 
on juvenile sentencing in this country. Since 2012, more than twenty states 
have abolished juvenile life without parole,363 more than 2200 sentences 
rendered unconstitutional by Roper, Graham, and Miller have been 
vacated,364 and hundreds of individuals sentenced to death or life without 
parole for crimes committed as juveniles have been resentenced.365 
Beyond its application to juvenile life without parole itself, the Court’s 
developmental framework is likely to influence numerous juvenile 
sentencing policies and practices, including mandatory minimum 
 
the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for defendants with mental illness 
because it does not meet the penological goals of retribution and deterrence). 
 361. See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 49 
(2010) (“It would be hard to overstate the significance of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Graham v. Florida.”); Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. 
REV. 1787, 1788 (2016) (arguing that Miller was revolutionary in logic and scope); 
Scott E. Sundby, The True Legacy of Atkins and Roper: The Unreliability Principle, 
Mentally Ill Defendants, and the Death Penalty’s Unraveling, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
487, 487 (2014) (arguing that “the cases have a far more revolutionary reach than 
their conventional understanding”). 
 362. See Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 86–92, 
105–06 (2015) (examining the implementation of Miller); Laura Cohen, Freedom’s 
Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida, 
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1087 (2014) (proposing substantial changes in juvenile 
sentencing to implement changes from Graham and Miller); Cara H. Drinan, 
Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51, 64–82 (2012) (analyzing the 
implementation of Graham); Perry L. Moriearty, Implementing Proportionality, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 961, 1028 (2017) (arguing the Court needs to provide guidance on 
defining the population of intellectually disabled and juvenile person for 
proportional sentencing relief); Moriearty, supra note 339, at 540 (noting difficulty in 
implementing the juvenile sentencing reform following Roper, Graham, and Miller). 
 363. States That Ban Life Without Parole for Children, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G 
OF YOUTH, https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/states-that-ban-
life [https://perma.cc/TWA6-ULJ4]. 
 364. The Miller Court estimated that approximately 2000 inmates in the United 
States were serving mandatory life without parole sentences for offenses they 
committed as juveniles, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 493–94 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting), the Graham Court identified 123 inmates who were sentenced as juveniles 
to life without parole for offenses other than homicide, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 
64 (2010), and 72 inmates were impacted by Roper. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN 2004: YEAR END REPORT 2 (2004), http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/DPICyer04.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7YL-V5N7]. 
 365. CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS: THE FIVE-YEAR 
GROUNDSWELL OF STATE BANS ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILDREN 7 (2016), 
https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/righting-wrongs [https://perma.cc/AV55-38AG]. 
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sentencing laws, automatic transfer statutes, sexual offender registration 
requirements, and any other laws that purport to treat juveniles and adults 
identically.366 As Justice Roberts lamented in his dissent in Miller, “[t]here 
is no clear reason that [the] principle [that children and adults are 
different for purposes of sentencing] would not bar all mandatory 
sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a 
similarly situated adult would receive.”367 Indeed, if juveniles are 
inherently less culpable than their adult counterparts when it comes to 
homicide, they are less culpable when it comes to other offenses as well. In 
fact, in the wake of Miller, several states have amended their laws to make 
adult court transfer more difficult.368 Plainly, this jurisprudence has begun 
to shape, and is likely to continue to shape, juvenile punishment and 
crime regulation in areas beyond homicide sentencing.369 Because the vast 
majority of juveniles subjected to this country’s harshest sentences are 
youth of color, they stand to benefit most from these constraints.370 
 
 366. See id. at 3, 7. 
 367. Miller, 567 U.S. at 501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 368. In the wake of Miller, several states have made adult court transfer more 
difficult. See Anne Teigen, 2013 Juvenile Justice State Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/2013-juvenile-justice-state-legislation.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/KB4K-RDR3]. 
 369. For example, a number of scholars and policy groups have advocated for a 
legislatively enacted “Youth Discount” in sentencing that uses age as a proxy for 
diminished criminal responsibility that would impose shorter sentences for youths 
than adults convicted of similar crimes. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
§ 6.11A reporter’s note a (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (acknowledging 
that the framework for “specialized sentencing rules and mitigated treatment of 
juvenile offenders sentenced in adult courts, owes” much to [Feld’s” proposal for a 
Youth Discount]—a sliding scale of developmental and criminal responsibility”); 
FELD, supra note 18, at 315–20 (discussing the youth discount concept as a mitigating 
factor in juvenile sentencing); FELD, supra note 21, at 220–23; ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & 
LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 246 (2008) (agreeing that 
“[p]roportionality supports imposing statutory limits on the maximum duration of 
adult sentences impose[d] on juveniles—a ‘youth discount,’ to use Feld’s term”); James 
C. Howell et al., Young Offenders and an Effective Justice System Response, in FROM JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION 213 
(Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2012) (concluding that “[y]ouths’ diminished 
responsibility required mitigated sanctions to avoid permanently life-changing 
penalties and provide room to reform”); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Owing 
to the Extreme Youth of the Accused: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92, J. 
CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 641, 697–98 (2003) (endorsing “Feld’s proposals [for a youth 
discount] because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally 
different than adults and that these differences make juveniles both less culpable for 
their crimes and less deserving of the harsh sanctions, which now must be imposed 
on serious and violent adults offenders”). 
 370. See supra Section II.D. 
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4. Reducing implicit racial bias 
Finally, studies suggest that cognitive biases are not inevitable, and 
stereotypes are not immutable. Research shows that the automaticity 
of biases can be neutralized through repeated negation of stereotypic 
associations, affirmation of positive associations with the cohort in 
question,371 and “social tuning,”372 which can be accomplished 
through relationship building with the target.373 When decision makers 
are made aware of their biases and are motivated to self-correct, they 
have the capacity to reduce their reliance on stereotypes.374 A relatively 
simple initial step would be the initiation of trainings to educate 
stakeholders about the pervasiveness and effects of implicit racial 
biases and to encourage them to self-examine. 
CONCLUSION 
The 50th Anniversary of In re Gault generated enormous interest 
and attention for good reason. The 1967 decision fundamentally 
altered the arc of juvenile justice in the United States. It took what 
until then had been an insulated, legal backwater system and 
subjected it to legal and eventually public scrutiny. In doing so, the 
Court brought to the juvenile court a measure of regularity and 
accountability that it badly needed. But if part of the Court’s mission was 
to improve outcomes for Black children, who, over the course of the 
juvenile court’s first fifty years were subjected to unequal and, in some 
cases, outright horrific treatment, Gault has not been a success. In fact, 
there is considerable evidence that the decision has made things worse. 
In part, this is a function of the Court’s decision to endorse procedural 
formality in the juvenile court while simultaneously rejecting a 
constitutional framework that might have given teeth to its procedural 
mandates. The net effect of these decisions was unintended and 
multifarious; it ushered in the transformation of the juvenile court 
from a quasi-social welfare agency to a formal legal institution that was 
as adversarial as its adult counterpart but lacked many of its core 
 
 371. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 248–49 (2002) (discussing suppression of 
stereotypes and the promotion of opposing counter-stereotypes). 
 372. See Graham & Lowery, supra note 44, at 501 (promoting “social tuning” as a 
means to counter unconscious bias in the juvenile justice system); Brian S. Lowery et 
al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
842, 851–52 (2001) (reporting experimental data supporting the same conclusion). 
 373. Graham & Lowery, supra note 44, at 501. 
 374. Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice 
Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267 (2012). 
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protections. In doing so, the Court also unwittingly prompted the 
juvenile court’s ideological reorientation from the “best interests” of the 
child to the gravity of the child’s offense375—one that has proved 
especially pernicious for the very defendants whose plight animated the 
Warren Court’s jurisprudence: Black children. 
Finally, we argue, the Court’s error was also conceptual. The primary 
source of racial injustice in the juvenile court was then what it is now—
social-structural inequality, too many crimes, too much punishment, and 
too many arrests and prosecutions of juveniles of color. These systemic 
disparities will not be reduced by additional or enhanced procedures. 
Because they are substantive problems, they must be addressed through 
substantive remedies. Gault did not and cannot do this. 
 
 375. See FELD, supra note 18, at 162–65 (demonstrating the shift in juvenile rights 
and explaining that in that context, “procedural reforms cannot compensate for the 
highly discretionary substantive standards—‘best interests of the child’ or a ‘serious 
risk’ of future crime—that preclude evenhanded enforcement and lend themselves 
to discriminatory applications”). 
